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Strengthening the Preventive Authority of Indonesia Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu): A Vulnerability and Outcome Based Model for Preventing Electoral Violations in North Lampung Regency

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Abstract

This study examines the exercise and strengthening of the preventive authority of the Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu) of North Lampung Regency in preventing electoral violations. Previous studies have largely examined electoral law enforcement and oversight mechanisms separately, leaving the relationships among legal authority, institutional practices, local constraints, and prevention outcomes at the regency level underexplored. This study employed a normative empirical legal research approach that integrated an analysis of legislation and the legal conception of Bawaslu's authority with empirical evidence obtained through semi structured interviews with three purposively selected informants and an analysis of oversight documents. The findings demonstrate that Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency exercises its preventive authority through electoral vulnerability mapping, the issuance of advisories and directives, tiered oversight, voter data oversight, participatory oversight, and inter agency coordination. These mechanisms indicate that preventive authority has been exercised in normative conformity with the applicable legal framework. However, its substantive effectiveness has not been adequately established because current measurements remain dominated by activity outputs and lack measurable outcome indicators. This study proposes an Integrated Vulnerability and Outcome Based Prevention Model that links risk mapping to oversight priorities, standardizes tiered oversight, promotes community based prevention, establishes follow up oriented coordination, integrates data systems with rapid response mechanisms, and incorporates outcome based evaluation. At the institutional level, this model promotes a shift from activity based reporting toward evidence and outcome based evaluation of preventive measures.

INTRODUCTION

Law Number 7 of 2017 on General Elections stipulates that one of the preventive measures undertaken by regency and municipal Election Supervisory Bodies (Bawaslu Kabupaten/Kota) is to identify and map the potential for electoral violations within their respective jurisdictions.[1] This provision confirms that regency and municipal Bawaslu are responsible not only for handling electoral violations but also for preventing them through vulnerability identification, oversight, evaluation, and public participation. This function is essential for safeguarding electoral principles and preventing potential violations at an early stage. Such authority is grounded in Law Number 7 of 2017, as amended by Law Number 7 of 2023. Butt and Siregar argue that electoral administration in Indonesia is complex.[2] The complexity of Indonesian elections, including their geographical scope, the size of the electorate, political interests, logistical requirements, and the potential for violations, necessitates multilayered oversight. Therefore, regency and municipal Bawaslu need to implement preventive, systematic, measurable oversight informed by local electoral vulnerabilities, particularly because many potential violations emerge at the local level.

The Election Supervisory Body of the Republic of Indonesia (Bawaslu RI) emphasizes that participatory oversight is intended to assign greater roles and responsibilities to the public.[3] Participatory oversight seeks to ensure that elections are democratic, conducted with integrity, and accountable. Public involvement is crucial given the limited number of official election supervisors, particularly because citizens can serve as sources of information, reporting parties, and Bawaslu's partners in preventing various electoral violations. Accordingly, the effectiveness of preventive efforts undertaken by Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency also depends on public legal awareness and community oversight networks. Winarto, Huda, and Ningtyas argue that public participation in electoral oversight helps strengthen Bawaslu's oversight function. As part of preventive efforts, members of the public can serve as Bawaslu volunteers and conduct outreach on

[1] Republik Indonesia, *Undang-Undang Nomor 7 Tahun 2017 tentang Pemilihan Umum*, Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 2017 Nomor 182, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Nomor 6109, Pasal 102 ayat (1) huruf a, 76, https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/37644/uu-no-7-tahun-2017.
[2] Simon Butt dan Fritz Siregar, "Multilayered Oversight: Electoral Administration in Indonesia," *Asian Journal of Comparative Law* 16, suppl. S1 (2021): S121, https://doi.org/10.1017/asjcl.2021.32.
[3] Badan Pengawas Pemilihan Umum Republik Indonesia, *Catatan Pengawasan Pemilihan 2020*, Buku 3 (Jakarta: Bawaslu Republik Indonesia, 2021), 129, https://www.bawaslu.go.id/sites/default/files/publikasi/BUKU%203%20Catatan%20Pengawasan%20Pemilihan%202020%20051121.pdf

electoral oversight.[4] Their study indicates that limited personnel and the extensive geographical scope of oversight underscore the importance of public involvement, although such participation has not yet reached an optimal level. However, the study focuses on the 2019 General Election in Kediri Regency and does not specifically examine the preventive authority of Bawaslu at the regency and municipal levels. This gap provides the basis for assessing the alignment between the regulatory framework governing such authority and its implementation by Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency.

Harahap, Busro, Priyono, and Sumardiana found that the principal barriers to electoral law enforcement include regulatory time constraints, ineffective sanctions, and gaps in inter agency coordination exacerbated by sociopolitical factors.[5] These findings indicate that electoral law enforcement continues to be constrained by statutory time limits, ineffective sanctions, institutional coordination problems, and sociopolitical conditions. Previous studies have focused primarily on addressing electoral violations at the national level and have not adequately examined Bawaslu's preventive authority at the regency level or the tangible outcomes of its preventive measures. Consequently, a gap remains in understanding the relationships among the legal norms governing such authority, institutional practices, local constraints, and prevention outcomes within Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency.

This study addresses two principal issues: the exercise of Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency's authority to prevent electoral violations under Law Number 7 of 2017 on General Elections, and the constraints and strengthening measures associated with the exercise of such authority. North Lampung Regency was selected as the study site to examine how the preventive function operates in a jurisdiction characterized by geographical diversity, limited access to certain areas, voter data dynamics, the need for tiered oversight, the risk of vote buying, concerns regarding the neutrality of public officials, and uneven levels of public participation. This study aims to assess the alignment between the authority conferred by legislation and the preventive practices implemented by Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency, identify legal and empirical constraints, and formulate institutional strengthening measures. The study makes an original contribution by adopting a normative empirical legal approach that integrates

[4] Agus Edi Winarto, H. M. Dimyati Huda, dan Trimurti Ningtyas, "Peran Bawaslu dalam Meningkatkan Partisipasi Masyarakat pada Pengawasan Pemilu 2019," *Reformasi: Jurnal Ilmiah Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik* 12, no. 2 (2022): 336, https://doi.org/10.33366/rfr.v12i2.3742

[5] Ali Umar Harahap, Achmad Busro, Ery Agus Priyono, dan Benny Sumardiana, "Legal Framework for Resolving Election Violations in Indonesia: Towards Electoral Justice," *Indonesian Journal of Criminal Law Studies* 10, no. 2 (2025): 985, https://doi.org/10.15294/ijcls.v10i2.24541

the analysis of legal norms, oversight documents, and interview findings while distinguishing between the outputs of preventive activities and substantive prevention outcomes. The study is expected to develop a model for strengthening preventive authority based on electoral vulnerability mapping, tiered oversight, public participation, inter agency coordination, the documentation of preventive measures, and compliance evaluation as a foundation for enhancing electoral integrity in North Lampung Regency.

METHODS

Scientific methodology serves as a means or instrument for achieving research objectives. As an instrument, it may be applied flexibly rather than rigidly, allowing research procedures to vary according to the formal object of the discipline under investigation.[6] Legal research methods may likewise be adapted to the object of inquiry, while legal research may address normative or empirical dimensions through different methodological approaches. This study adopted a normative empirical legal research design incorporating statutory, conceptual, and sociological approaches. The normative component was used to analyze the preventive authority of Bawaslu at the regency and municipal levels under Law Number 7 of 2017 on General Elections and its implementing regulations. The empirical component examined the exercise of this authority by Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency. The data were examined using qualitative descriptive analysis by comparing the prescribed legal norms (das sollen) with their implementation in practice (das sein).

Study Sites, Dates, and Participants. Abdussamad explains that purposive sampling is a technique for selecting data sources according to specific considerations.[7] Informants were selected based on their knowledge, positions, experience, and direct involvement in the subject matter or context under investigation. Interviews were conducted in Bandar Lampung on June 18, 2026, and in Kotabumi on June 19, 2026. Three informants were purposively selected: HBM, Coordinator of the Prevention and Community Participation Division at Bawaslu of Lampung Province; PIS, Chair of Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency; and PD, Coordinator of the Legal Affairs and Dispute Resolution Division. These informants were selected because their responsibilities and experience relate directly to the prevention of electoral violations, participatory oversight, institutional strengthening, and constraints on electoral oversight.

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[6] Nurul Qamar dan Farah Syah Rezah, *Metode Penelitian Hukum: Doktrinal dan Non-Doktrinal* (Makassar: Social Politic Genius [SIGn], 2020), 4, https://repository.umi.ac.id/2676/1/9786025522468.pdf.
[7]Zuchri Abdussamad, *Metode Penelitian Kualitatif* (Makassar: Syakir Media Press, 2021), 137, https://repository.ung.ac.id/get/karyailmiah/8793/Buku-Metode-Penelitian-Kualitatif.pdf

Data Types, Sources, and Research Instruments. This study used primary and secondary data. The primary data were obtained from interviews with the three informants concerning the exercise of preventive authority, electoral vulnerability mapping, the issuance of advisories, tiered oversight, public participation, and barriers relating to geography, institutional capacity, information technology, voter data, vote buying, and the neutrality of public officials. The secondary data comprised primary legal materials, including legislation and Bawaslu regulations; secondary legal materials, including books and scholarly journal articles; and tertiary legal materials, including dictionaries and other supporting legal references. The research instruments included the researcher as the principal instrument, a semi structured interview guide developed around the two research issues, a recording device, field notes, and a document review checklist.

Data Collection and Analysis Procedures. Nugroho, Haryani, and Farkhani state that interviews involve direct question and answer exchanges between researchers and respondents, interviewees, or informants to obtain information.[8] In empirical legal research, interviews provide information that cannot be fully obtained through observation or document review. Data were collected through library research and field research. Library research involved identifying, reviewing, and classifying legislation, books, journal articles, and electoral oversight documents. Field research was conducted through semi structured interviews and documentation. Data validity was assessed by cross checking information across informants and against legal documents. The data were subsequently reduced, categorized according to the research focus, interpreted from a legal perspective, and analyzed to draw conclusions through a combination of inductive and deductive reasoning.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The discussion in this study is limited to the prevention of violations relating to general elections (*Pemilu*) governed by Law Number 7 of 2017 on General Elections. Several informants used the term "2024 Regional Head Elections" (*Pemilihan Tahun 2024*) to refer to the elections of governors, regents, and mayors. Data from these responses were retained insofar as they illustrate institutional patterns of preventive action, including electoral vulnerability mapping, the issuance of advisories, coordination, tiered

[8] Sigit Sapto Nugroho, Anik Tri Haryani, dan Farkhani, *Metodologi Riset Hukum* (Surakarta: Oase Pustaka, 2020), 71, https://unmermadiun.ac.id/repository_jurnal_penelitian/Sigit%20Sapto%20Nugroho/URL%20Buku%20Ajar/BUKU%20METODOLOGI%20RISET%20HUKUM.pdf

oversight, and participatory oversight. Nevertheless, the analysis of the legal basis of Bawaslu's authority remains situated within the framework governing general elections under Law Number 7 of 2017 and its implementing regulations.

1. The Exercise of the Authority of Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency to Prevent Electoral Violations

a. The Legal Status of the Preventive Authority of Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency

Electoral management bodies are increasingly recognized as fourth branch institutions that play a vital role in safeguarding electoral democracy.[9] Birch and van Ham emphasize that effective oversight institutions play a critical role in ensuring rigorous scrutiny of electoral processes.[10] The quality of elections depends not only on the formal independence of electoral management bodies (EMBs), but also on their autonomy, institutional capacity, and the strength of their legal authority. Strengthening institutional capacity is therefore particularly important in emerging democracies.[11] The formal status of electoral institutions must be supported by adequate autonomy, resources, and institutional capacity. Lundstedt and Edgell demonstrate that strengthening the capacity of electoral management bodies can increase the costs of engaging in vote buying[12]

One of Bawaslu's statutory duties and powers is to prevent electoral violations by strengthening public participation.[13] Bawaslu at the regency and municipal levels derives original statutory authority directly from Law Number 7 of 2017 to oversee the conduct of elections and prevent electoral violations. This authority is further specified in Bawaslu Regulation Number 5 of 2022, as amended by Bawaslu Regulation Number 2 of 2024.[14]

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[9] Paul Kildea, "The Constitutional Role of Electoral Management Bodies: The Case of the Australian Electoral Commission," *Federal Law Review* 48, no. 4 (2020): 469, https://doi.org/10.1177/0067205X20955097

[10] Sarah Birch dan Carolien van Ham, "Getting Away with Foul Play? The Importance of Formal and Informal Oversight Institutions for Electoral Integrity," *European Journal of Political Research* 56, no. 3 (2017): 487, https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12189

[11] Malcolm Langford, Rebecca Schiel, dan Bruce M. Wilson, "The Rise of Electoral Management Bodies: Diffusion and Effects," *Asian Journal of Comparative Law* 16, special issue 1 (2021): S79, https://doi.org/10.1017/asjcl.2021.29

[12] Martin Lundstedt dan Amanda B. Edgell, "Electoral Management and Vote-Buying," *Electoral Studies* 79 (2022): 1, article 102521, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102521.

[13] Erga Yuhandra, Iman Jalaludin Rifa'i, Suwari Akhmaddhian, Haris Budiman, dan Yani Andriyani, "Efektivitas Fungsi Pencegahan Badan Pengawas Pemilihan Umum Dalam Melakukan Pencegahan Pelanggaran Pemilu," *Jurnal Ius Constituendum* 8, no. 1 (2023): 11, https://doi.org/10.26623/jic.v8i1.3015

[14] Badan Pengawas Pemilihan Umum Republik Indonesia, *Peraturan Badan Pengawas Pemilihan Umum Nomor 5 Tahun 2022 tentang Pengawasan Penyelenggaraan Pemilihan Umum*, Berita Negara Republik

Electoral oversight is conducted through Subdistrict Election Supervisory Committees (*Panwaslu Kecamatan*), Ward/Village Election Supervisors (*Panwaslu Kelurahan/Desa*), and Polling Station Supervisors (*Pengawas TPS*), with findings reported upward through the relevant hierarchical levels. These provisions demonstrate that Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency does not exercise its authority in isolation but through a vertical oversight structure. At the regency level, Bawaslu directs, coordinates, and controls electoral oversight, while subdistrict, ward/village, and polling station supervisors perform oversight functions closer to the sites and subjects being monitored. This tiered structure is essential because electoral violations may occur at any stage of the electoral process and extend to the village and polling station levels.

The importance of the preventive function was also emphasized by HBM, who stated:

Prevention is more effective than enforcement in safeguarding democratic quality and electoral integrity. (Interview with HBM, Coordinator of the Prevention and Community Participation Division at Bawaslu of Lampung Province, Bandar Lampung, June 18, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. Western Indonesian Time (WIB)).

This statement positions prevention as the primary instrument for reducing the likelihood of violations before enforcement mechanisms are invoked. Enforcement remains necessary once a violation has occurred, but it cannot always remedy all resulting democratic harm. Vote buying, the dissemination of false information, the mobilization of public officials, and voter disenfranchisement may compromise voters' freedom even when the perpetrators are subsequently sanctioned. Preventive authority must therefore be exercised throughout the electoral process, from planning, voter data updating, candidate nomination, campaigning, and logistics distribution to voting, vote counting, and the tabulation of election results.

Agustin, Rizal, and Saptaji argue that Bawaslu's preventive measures constitute an integral component of electoral justice.[15] Electoral justice is also advanced through prevention and public participation. Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency has performed this function through electoral vulnerability mapping, advisories, coordination, oversight, monitoring posts, and public engagement. However, its effectiveness must be assessed in terms of whether these preventive measures reach the appropriate targets,

Indonesia Tahun 2023 Nomor 1071, 4-5, https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/254603/peraturan-bawaslu-no-5-tahun-2022.

[15] Elva Astri Agustin, Lutfi Fahrul Rizal, dan Aji Saptaji, "Pemetaan Indeks Kerawanan Pemilu 2024 Perspektif Siyasah Dusturiyah," *PAMALI: Pattimura Magister Law Review* 4, no. 2 (2024): 156, https://doi.org/10.47268/pamali.v4i2.2206.

generate follow up action, increase public participation, and reduce the risk of electoral violations.

2. Electoral Vulnerability Mapping as a Basis for Setting Oversight Priorities

Birch and Muchlinski explain that the increasing incidence of electoral violence across countries has created a need for more comprehensive electoral vulnerability data. Through the Dataset of Countries at Risk of Electoral Violence (CREV), they provide measures of ten forms of electoral violence across 642 elections held worldwide between 1995 and 2013.[16] This finding indicates that electoral vulnerability mapping should distinguish among the types and characteristics of potential threats rather than merely calculate the aggregate number of incidents. Daxecker et al. emphasize the importance of identifying the timing of incidents, their precise geographical locations, and the actors involved.[17] Birch and Muchlinski further explain that efforts to identify the risk factors associated with electoral violence have paved the way for the development of various electoral violence prediction (EVP) techniques.[18] Randahl et al. emphasize that forecasting which elections are at risk of violence is essential to effective prevention.[19] Based on these perspectives, electoral vulnerability mapping can provide a basis for setting the oversight priorities of Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency. This process should identify the types of vulnerability, incident histories, locations, timing, actors, likelihood, and potential impact of each risk. Bawaslu can then direct personnel, oversight patrols, public outreach, and preventive coordination toward the subdistricts and polling stations with the highest levels of electoral vulnerability.

The exercise of preventive authority by Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency begins with identifying and mapping vulnerabilities at each stage of the electoral process. PIS explained:

> *One way in which Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency exercises its authority to prevent electoral violations is by mapping potential violations at each stage of the electoral process to determine oversight priorities.* (Interview with PIS, Chair of Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency, Kotabumi, June 19, 2026, at 1:00 p.m. WIB).

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[16] Sarah Birch dan David Muchlinski, "The Dataset of Countries at Risk of Electoral Violence," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 32, no. 2 (2020): 217, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2017.1364636

[17] Ursula Daxecker, Elio Amicarelli, dan Alexander Jung, "Electoral Contention and Violence (ECAV): A New Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 56, no. 5 (2019): 714, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318823870

[18] Sarah Birch dan David Muchlinski, "Electoral Violence Prevention: What Works?," *Democratization* 25, no. 3 (2018): 386, https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2017.1365841.

[19] David Randahl et al., "Forecasting Electoral Violence," *International Journal of Forecasting* 42, no. 2 (2026): 602, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijforecast.2025.09.003

The mapping process identified several potential vulnerabilities, as she further explained:

> *The vulnerabilities identified included vote buying, reductions in the number of polling stations, logistics distribution, the neutrality of the State Civil Apparatus (ASN), inaccuracies in voter data, the dissemination of false information, and the politicization of issues involving ethnicity, religion, race, and intergroup relations (SARA).* (Interview with PIS, Chair of Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency, Kotabumi, June 19, 2026, at 1:00 p.m. WIB).

The mapping demonstrates that the preventive responsibilities of Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency encompass administrative, social, political, geographical, and information technology dimensions. Risks associated with inaccurate voter data and logistics distribution concern the technical administration of elections. Vote buying, the politicization of SARA related issues, and the dissemination of false information concern the conduct of electoral contestants and members of the public. Civil service neutrality concerns the use of bureaucratic influence, while reductions in the number of polling stations affect voter access, particularly in hard to reach areas. These diverse vulnerabilities require Bawaslu to adopt preventive measures tailored to each specific problem.

The Electoral Vulnerability Index, potential electoral violations, and electoral oversight are interrelated components of an integrated framework.[20] Electoral vulnerability mapping should consider records of previous violations, geographical coverage, political dynamics, levels of public knowledge, and rates of participation in each village or subdistrict. The interview findings support this view. Vulnerability mapping must not end with the compilation of a list of risks. Its findings must be translated into priority areas, objects of oversight, activity schedules, responsible officers, staffing requirements, coordination mechanisms, and performance indicators. Areas at risk of vote buying require voter education and community based campaigns against vote buying. Areas with limited transportation access require stronger supervisory capacity at the subdistrict and village levels. Vulnerabilities relating to voter data require factual and administrative verification, while those involving false information require social media monitoring and digital literacy initiatives. Electoral vulnerability mapping must also be updated at each stage of the electoral process because the types and levels of risk may change. Vulnerability data from the campaign stage cannot be applied in their entirety to the oversight of voter data updating or logistics distribution. Dynamic

[20] Dede Irawan, "Kampung Pengawasan Partisipatif dan Road Map Indeks Kerawanan Pemilu di Kabupaten Indramayu," *Jurnal Adhyasta Pemilu* 5, no. 1 (2022): 25, https://doi.org/10.55108/jap.v5i1.85

mapping enables Bawaslu to allocate resources according to actual needs rather than distribute activities uniformly without considering differences in risk levels.

3. Issuance of Advisory Letters, Preventive Directives, and Tiered Oversight

The interview findings indicate that electoral vulnerability mapping is followed by the issuance of advisory letters to relevant parties. PIS explained

> *Preventive advisory letters are issued to remind all relevant parties to perform their duties and obligations in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.* (Interview with PIS, Chair of Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency, Kotabumi, June 19, 2026, at 1:00 p.m. WIB).

An advisory letter constitutes an administrative preventive measure intended to promote compliance before a violation occurs. Its content should specify the legal basis, the intended recipients, the conduct required or prohibited, the stage of the electoral process concerned, and the legal consequences of noncompliance. The effectiveness of advisory letters cannot be assessed solely by the number issued. Evaluation should also consider whether the letters were received, how the recipients responded, whether they complied with their contents, and whether similar violations recurred after their issuance. In addition to issuing advisories to electoral contestants and other stakeholders, Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency issues directives to subordinate electoral supervisors. PD explained:

> *Preventive directives are issued to Subdistrict Election Supervisory Committees (Panwaslu Kecamatan) to ensure that each stage of the electoral process is monitored intensively through a tiered oversight structure at the subdistrict level.* (Interview with PD, Coordinator of the Legal Affairs and Dispute Resolution Division at Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency, Kotabumi, June 19, 2026, at 3:00 p.m. WIB).

PD further stated:

> *These directives guide the Subdistrict Election Supervisory Committees in identifying, preventing, and reporting potential violations within their respective jurisdictions. (*Interview with PD, Coordinator of the Legal Affairs and Dispute Resolution Division at Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency, Kotabumi, June 19, 2026, at 3:00 p.m. WIB).

Preventive directives serve an internal function by standardizing the understanding and actions of electoral supervisors throughout the institutional hierarchy. This arrangement demonstrates the relationship between the authority exercised by Bawaslu at the regency level and its technical implementation at the subdistrict, village, and polling station levels. Such directives are effective when they specify deadlines, reporting formats, objects of inspection, procedures for escalating information, and the required follow up on potential violations. Directives formulated only in general terms risk

generating administrative reports that contain no actionable information for preventing electoral violations.

4. Oversight of Voter Data Updating

Oversight of voter data updating should be positioned as both a mechanism for protecting voting rights and a means of maintaining control over electoral administration. Anggalana observes that measures to fulfill the constitutional and political right to vote of persons with disabilities have not been implemented adequately.[21] Malik explains that oversight, as an integral component of the management process, is unavoidable.[22] Jainah et al. state that oversight may take the form of preventive oversight or repressive oversight.[23] Rinova observes that declining voter participation has re emerged as a significant concern for multiple stakeholders.[24] Based on these perspectives, the accuracy of voter lists requires careful oversight because registration on a voter list constitutes an administrative prerequisite for exercising the right to vote and participating in general elections.

Voter data updating is one area that receives particular attention in the exercise of authority by Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency. Voter data are directly linked to the protection of citizens' constitutional voting rights. HBM stated:

> *Voter data provide the basis for preparing voter lists at subsequent stages and are directly linked to the fulfillment of the public's right to vote. (*Interview with HBM, Coordinator of the Prevention and Community Participation Division at Bawaslu of Lampung Province, Bandar Lampung, June 18, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. WIB*).*

He further identified potential violations during the voter data matching and verification process (pencocokan dan penelitian, or coklit):

> *Potential violations during coklit include Voter Data Updating Officers (Pantarlih) failing to visit voters in person, delegating their duties to other parties, failing to remove ineligible voters, and failing to register eligible voters. (*Interview with HBM, Coordinator of the

[21] Anggalana, "Pemenuhan Hak Konstitusionalitas-Politik untuk Memilih bagi Penyandang Disabilitas dalam Pemilukada Gubernur, Bupati dan Walikota," dalam *Perkembangan Hukum di Indonesia*, ed. B. Salatar (Bandar Lampung: Universitas Bandar Lampung Press, 2018), 133, https://ubl.ac.id/monograph-ubl/index.php/Monograf/catalog/download/24/51/242-1?inline=1.

[22] Malik, "Kualitas Pengawasan Pimpinan dalam Pembinaan Disiplin Anggota Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja Provinsi Lampung," *Jurnal Kebijakan & Pelayanan Publik* 4, no. 2 (2018): 54, https://jurnal.ubl.ac.id/index.php/ejkpp/article/view/1051.

[23] Zainab Ompu Jainah et al., *Pelaksanaan Pembatalan Peraturan Daerah di Indonesia* (Bandar Lampung: Universitas Bandar Lampung Press, 2021), 176, https://publikasi.ubl.ac.id/index.php/Monograf/catalog/download/69/88/403-1?inline=1.

[24] Dora Rinova, "Model Strategi Pemasaran Politik Pilgub Provinsi Lampung 2014," *Jurnal Kebijakan & Pelayanan Publik* 2, no. 3 (2016): 29, https://jurnal.ubl.ac.id/index.php/ejkpp/article/view/821.

Prevention and Community Participation Division at Bawaslu of Lampung Province, Bandar Lampung, June 18, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. WIB*)*.

Voter data oversight comprises procedural and substantive oversight. Procedural oversight ensures that Pantarlih officers conduct the matching and verification process through direct visits in accordance with the applicable requirements. Substantive oversight ensures that eligible citizens are included and ineligible individuals are removed from the voter list. Data errors may result in voter disenfranchisement, duplicate voter records, or ballots being cast by ineligible individuals. PIS explained that voter data are dynamic because of population movement, deaths, and the emergence of newly eligible voters. Preventive measures include overseeing the updating process from the matching and verification stage through the preparation of the Provisional Voter List (DPS), the Revised Provisional Voter List (DPSHP), and the Final Voter List (DPT), while also providing channels for public input.

A report issued by Bawaslu of Lampung Province documented the establishment of Voter Rights Monitoring Posts (Posko Kawal Hak Pilih) at 2,899 locations across Lampung Province.[25] Preventive measures during the preparation of voter lists also included advisory letters, electoral vulnerability identification, participatory oversight education, public outreach, digital literacy initiatives, citizen forums, Participatory Oversight Villages, institutional cooperation, and public information campaigns. These data concern activities conducted in the context of the 2024 Regional Head Elections and are therefore not used as direct evidence of oversight during the 2024 General Election in North Lampung Regency. Nevertheless, they demonstrate continuity in the institutional pattern of voter list oversight across Lampung Province. This pattern provides a relevant comparison because voter list preparation continues to require electoral vulnerability identification, complaint posts, detailed examination of voter data, and recommendations for corrective action.

5. Participatory Oversight and InterAgency Coordination

Participatory oversight can extend the reach of formal oversight through the independent involvement of citizens and relevant stakeholders.[26] Fitriyanti and Mubarak emphasize that clear regulations enable more effective and efficient inter agency

[25] Badan Pengawas Pemilihan Umum Provinsi Lampung, *Laporan Hasil Pengawasan Tahapan Penyusunan Daftar Pemilih Pemilihan Tahun 2024* (Bandar Lampung: Bawaslu Provinsi Lampung, 2024), 1, https://lampung.bawaslu.go.id/sites/prov_lampung/files/uploads/2024/11/LAPORAN-HASIL-PENGAWASAN-DPT-22-SEPT-2024.pdf.

[26] Ratnia Solihah, Arry Bainus, dan Iding Rosyidin, "Pentingnya Pengawasan Partisipatif dalam Mengawal Pemilihan Umum yang Berintegritas dan Demokratis," *Jurnal Wacana Politik* 3, no. 1 (2018): 16, https://doi.org/10.24198/jwp.v3i1.16082.

coordination while reducing overlapping responsibilities, miscommunication, and breaches of discipline.[27] Participatory oversight must be supported by inter agency coordination based on clearly defined responsibilities, regulatory foundations, and communication channels so that community reports and findings can be followed up consistently. Given the limited number of formal election supervisors, public participation constitutes an essential component of the exercise of preventive authority. PIS explained:

Bawaslu promotes public participation through public outreach and political education targeting citizens, first time voters, community leaders, and civil society organizations. (Interview with PIS, Chair of Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency, Kotabumi, June 19, 2026, at 1:00 p.m. WIB).

The programs implemented include Participatory Oversight Villages (Kampung Pengawasan), Oversight Corners (Pojok Pengawasan), discussion forums, public outreach activities, and Public Complaint Posts (Posko Aduan Masyarakat). These posts facilitate the submission of public reports and information concerning potential or suspected electoral violations, thereby enabling preventive action at an earlier stage. Participatory oversight performs two functions in this context. First, it extends the reach of Bawaslu's oversight. Citizens are closer to events that may constitute electoral violations, including covert vote buying practices. Second, it fosters a culture of compliance with electoral law by encouraging citizens to reject, document, and report violations. Participation should not be limited to attendance at public outreach activities. It should develop the public's capacity to identify the constituent elements of electoral violations, preserve evidence, and use the available reporting channels.

Preventive measures are also implemented through coordination with other institutions. PD stated:

> *Coordination and supervision involve the General Elections Commission (KPU), regional governments, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), the Indonesian National Police (Polri), the prosecution service, civil society organizations, youth organizations, the mass media, and other relevant stakeholders.* (Interview with PD, Coordinator of the Legal Affairs and Dispute Resolution Division at Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency, Kotabumi, June 19, 2026, at 3:00 p.m. WIB).

[27] Wani Fitriyanti dan Adil Mubarak, "Peran Koordinasi Pemerintah Provinsi Sumatera Barat dalam Penanggulangan Radikalisme dan Terorisme," *Jurnal Dinamika Pemerintahan* 7, no. 2 (2024): 198, https://doi.org/10.36341/jdp.v7i2.4931.

Coordination is necessary because Bawaslu lacks the authority to resolve every issue independently. Corrections to voter data require follow up by the KPU. The removal of campaign materials may involve regional governments and the Civil Service Police Unit (Satpol PP). Suspected electoral crimes require the involvement of the police and prosecution service through the Integrated Electoral Law Enforcement Center (Sentra Gakkumdu). Safeguarding the neutrality of public officials requires coordination with civil service authorities and regional governments. Preventing the spread of false information requires cooperation with the media, civil society, and institutions responsible for digital communications. Coordination must produce measurable actions rather than merely formal meetings. Each coordination activity should specify its agenda, division of responsibilities, expected outcomes, follow up deadlines, and documentation requirements. Without adequate follow up, coordination may become an administrative output that has no substantive effect on the prevention of electoral violations.

6. Analysis of the Effectiveness of the Exercise of Preventive Authority

Bawaslu's Performance Report states that Bawaslu is independently responsible for planning, implementing, measuring, and monitoring its performance and reporting the results.[28] Performance measurement assesses the extent to which programs achieve predetermined objectives and benchmarks. The interview findings indicate that Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency has exercised its preventive authority in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations through electoral vulnerability mapping, the issuance of advisories, directives to subordinate supervisors, voter list oversight, direct monitoring, coordination, public outreach, and the establishment of monitoring posts. These measures demonstrate compliance with the relevant legal authority and procedural requirements. However, the interview data do not provide quantitative measures of compliance with the advisories, the proportion of recommendations for corrective action that were implemented, reductions in repeated violations, the number of public reports or information that could be verified, or changes in electoral vulnerability levels following preventive interventions.

These conditions demonstrate an important distinction between prevention outputs and prevention outcomes. The number of advisories, public outreach activities, citizen forums, and monitoring posts constitutes prevention outputs. By contrast, reductions in electoral violations, increased compliance, protection of voting rights, an increase in

[28] Badan Pengawas Pemilihan Umum Republik Indonesia, *Laporan Kinerja Instansi Pemerintah Bawaslu Tahun 2024* (Jakarta: Bawaslu Republik Indonesia, 2025), 1, https://eppid.bawaslu.go.id/api/services/file/uploads/dip/berkala/1758255695261-1742438014111-LKIP_BAWASLU_2024.pdf

reports that satisfy applicable requirements, and the non recurrence of violations constitute prevention outcomes. Although Bawaslu has exercised its authority in normative terms, its substantive effectiveness must be assessed using outcome indicators. Regarding the first research question, the findings demonstrate that Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency exercises its preventive authority through five principal patterns: stage specific electoral vulnerability mapping; the issuance of advisories and preventive directives; tiered oversight; participatory oversight; and inter agency coordination. These practices align with the legal framework governing Bawaslu at the regency and municipal levels. Nevertheless, performance measurement must shift from counting activities toward assessing changes in compliance and reductions in the risk of electoral violations.

7. Constraints on and Measures to Strengthen the Preventive Authority of Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency

a. Geographical Constraints and the Limited Number of Election Supervisors

The limited number of field supervisors and difficulties in accessing remote or isolated areas prevent comprehensive oversight of campaign materials.[29] The first constraint arises from the extensive territory and geographical diversity of North Lampung Regency. PIS explained:

> *The extensive territory of North Lampung Regency, its diverse geographical conditions, limited transportation access, and the presence of several hard toreach areas constrain the implementation of electoral oversight.* (Interview with PIS, Chair of Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency, Kotabumi, June 19, 2026, at 1:00 p.m. WIB).

PD reinforced this observation:

> *The number of available supervisors is often insufficient given the size of the jurisdiction and the number of oversight targets requiring attention.* (Interview with PD, Coordinator of the Legal Affairs and Dispute Resolution Division at Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency, Kotabumi, June 19, 2026, at 3:00 p.m. WIB).

Geographical constraints affect the speed with which supervisors receive information, reach relevant locations, document incidents, and implement preventive measures. These constraints become more severe during stages conducted within short periods, including the campaign silence period, logistics distribution, voting, and vote counting. Delays by election supervisors may allow conduct that could have been prevented to develop into an electoral violation.

[29] Jafar Abdul Azis dan Ali Azhar, "Peran Bawaslu dalam Penegakan Hukum dan Pemberian Sanksi terhadap Alat Peraga Kampanye pada Pilkada Serentak Wilayah Hukum Administrasi Kabupaten Indragiri Hilir," *Indragiri Law Review* 2, no. 2 (2024): 30, https://doi.org/10.32520/ilr.v2i2.52.

The measures implemented to address these constraints include optimizing the roles of Subdistrict Election Supervisory Committees (Panwaslu Kecamatan), Ward/Village Election Supervisors, and Polling Station Supervisors. PD stated that supervisory capacity is strengthened through technical guidance and training. Tiered oversight provides an appropriate solution, but its effectiveness depends on the ability of ad hoc election supervisors to understand applicable requirements, identify potential violations, collect information, prepare reports, and promptly escalate incidents. A single technical guidance session is insufficient to strengthen this capacity. Additional measures should include case simulations, concise stage specific guidelines, rapid consultation mechanisms, oversight route mapping, and a digital reporting system capable of operating in low connectivity environments.

8. Vote Buying and Low Public Awareness

Wirda et al. found that low public awareness of the consequences of vote buying constitutes a major barrier to reporting electoral violations.[30] Vote buying remains one of the principal challenges because it is conducted covertly and continues to be regarded as normal by some members of the public. HBM explained:

> *Vote buying is generally conducted covertly and continues to be regarded as a normal practice by some members of the public in the period preceding elections. (*Interview with HBM, Coordinator of the Prevention and Community Participation Division at Bawaslu of Lampung Province, Bandar Lampung, June 18, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. WIB*).*

The covert nature of vote buying makes it difficult for election supervisors to obtain evidence and identify witnesses. Its normalization also prevents some citizens from recognizing the distribution of money or goods as a reportable electoral violation. Some community members may simultaneously receive benefits and shield the practice from scrutiny. Consequently, formal preventive measures, including advisory letters, do not always prove effective.

Riwanto et al. argue that an anti vote buying village model that mobilizes existing social capital can serve as a strategy for Bawaslu to prevent vote buying in regional head elections.[31] Prevention can be pursued through community movements supported by Bawaslu, village governments, universities, religious leaders, and community leaders to foster collective resistance to vote buying. General public outreach should be developed

[30] Ismi Wirda, Lalu Sopan Tirta Kusuma, dan Inka Nusamuda Pratama, "Peran Badan Pengawas Pemilu dalam Upaya Pencegahan Politik Uang pada Pemilihan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Tahun 2024 di Kabupaten Dompu," *Jurnal Ilmiah Detubuya: The Indonesian Journal of the Social Sciences* 2, no. 2 (2025): 155.
[31] Agus Riwanto, Achmad, Suranto, Sunny Ummul Firdaus, dan Sri Wahyuni, "Membangun Model Desa Anti Politik Uang sebagai Strategi Bawaslu dalam Mencegah Pilkada Curang," *Masalah-Masalah Hukum* 50, no. 3 (2021): 286-287, https://doi.org/10.14710/mmh.50.3.2021.279-289.

into community based interventions in villages or subdistricts with high electoral vulnerability levels. The Participatory Oversight Village program (Kampung Pengawasan) can be transformed into an anti vote buying community based on citizen commitments, legal education, complaint channels, protection of informants' identities, and the involvement of local leaders. Program effectiveness should be assessed through changes in public attitudes, willingness to provide information, and reductions in repeated vote buying practices rather than solely through participant numbers. PIS also identified low levels of public participation:

Some members of the public still lack sufficient awareness and active participation in monitoring or reporting suspected electoral violations. (Interview with PIS, Chair of Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency, Kotabumi, June 19, 2026, at 1:00 p.m. WIB).

Amal found that participatory oversight was effective in reducing the number of electoral violations in West Java Province.[32] Participatory oversight education programs, citizen forums, Oversight Corners, partnerships with universities, and digital communities were found to broaden public involvement in electoral oversight. These findings support the strengthening of participatory oversight in North Lampung. Nevertheless, the causal relationship between participatory programs and reductions in violations must be assessed cautiously. Declining numbers of recorded violations may also reflect regulatory changes, reporting patterns, supervisory capacity, or the nature of electoral competition. Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency should record the volume, quality, geographical distribution, and types of information submitted by the public, together with the resulting follow up actions, to assess the contribution of participatory oversight more objectively.

9. Dynamics of Voter Data

Previous research has identified several problems within the existing electoral system, including invalid and administratively complex source data, system delays in responding to changes in civil registration status, and the unclear application of de facto and de jure registration methods in voter databases.[33] A further constraint arises from the continuous changes in population data. PIS stated:

[32] Bakhrul Amal, "Efektivitas Pengawasan Partisipatif dalam Mengurangi Jumlah Pelanggaran Pemilu 2024 di Jawa Barat," *Jurnal Keadilan Pemilu* 5, no. 2 (2024): 211, https://doi.org/10.55108/jkp.v5i2.491
[33] Mochamad Adli Wafi, Wibisena Caesario, dan Deka Oktaviana, "Pemutakhiran Data Pemilihan Umum melalui Satu Data Indonesia dalam Menjamin Hak Pilih Warga Negara," *Jurnal Legislatif* 6, no. 2 (2023): 98, https://doi.org/10.20956/jl.v6i2.26771

*Voter data are dynamic because of population movement, deaths, and the emergence of newly eligible voters, which frequently create challenges in updating voter data. (*Interview with PIS, Chair of Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency, Kotabumi, June 19, 2026, at 1:00 p.m. WIB*)*

Problems with voter lists do not arise solely from errors by electoral administrators. They may also result from changes in civil registration status after voter data have been finalized. Additional constraints include discrepancies between databases, delays in civil registration, changes of domicile, unrecorded deaths, and newly eligible voters who have not yet been registered.

Existing measures include overseeing the voter matching and verification process (coklit), the Provisional Voter List (DPS), the Revised Provisional Voter List (DPSHP), and the Final Voter List (DPT), while providing channels for public input. This oversight can be strengthened through reviews based on individual names and addresses, factual verification involving vulnerable groups, regular coordination with the General Elections Commission (KPU) and the Population and Civil Registration Office, and comprehensive documentation of all recommendations for corrective action. Bawaslu should maintain a monitoring register containing the type of problem, the date of the recommendation, the recipient institution, the follow up action, and the resolution status. This mechanism would enable oversight to shift from one time inspections toward the continuous management of voter data corrections.

10. Neutrality of the State Civil Apparatus and Village Officials

Potential partisanship among public officials constitutes a significant constraint because they possess institutional resources, formal authority, bureaucratic networks, and direct relationships with the public. PD explained:

> *Potential violations of the neutrality of the State Civil Apparatus (ASN) remain, including support for electoral contestants and involvement in partisan political activities.* (Interview with PD, Coordinator of the Legal Affairs and Dispute Resolution Division at Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency, Kotabumi, June 19, 2026, at 3:00 p.m. WIB).

Preventive measures have included coordination, public outreach, advisory letters, and oversight of ASN personnel and village officials. Bawaslu has also coordinated with regional governments and institutions responsible for civil service affairs. Government Regulation Number 94 of 2021 establishes the obligations, prohibitions, and disciplinary sanctions applicable to civil servants (PNS) who commit violations.[34] The regulation

[34] Republik Indonesia, *Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 94 Tahun 2021 tentang Disiplin Pegawai Negeri Sipil*, Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 2021 Nomor 202, Tambahan Lembaran Negara Republik Indonesia Nomor 6718, Pasal 5 huruf n, 7-8, https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/177031/pp-no-94-tahun-2021.

prohibits civil servants from supporting candidates for President and Vice President, regional head candidates, and candidates for the House of Representatives (DPR), Regional Representative Council (DPD), or Regional Houses of Representatives (DPRD) through various forms of political involvement.

Preventing violations of ASN neutrality should begin before the campaign stage through the identification of high risk positions, case based public education, advisory letters specifying prohibited conduct, and social media oversight. Coordination undertaken only after a violation has been detected is insufficient. Regional governments should ensure that the heads of regional agencies disseminate neutrality requirements and conduct internal oversight. Bawaslu must nevertheless preserve its independence to ensure that coordination with regional governments does not weaken the rigor of electoral oversight.

11. Hoaxes, Disinformation, and Hate Speech

Developments in information technology have expanded the space available for campaigning while generating new forms of electoral vulnerability. HBM stated:

> *The dissemination of hoaxes, disinformation, and hate speech through social media presents a significant challenge to electoral oversight.* (Interview with HBM, Coordinator of the Prevention and Community Participation Division at Bawaslu of Lampung Province, Bandar Lampung, June 18, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. WIB).

Online education constitutes an important strategy for reaching the public on a broader scale.[35] Mitigating hoaxes requires monitoring relevant accounts and keywords, recording oversight findings, conducting legal and cyber analyses, coordinating with relevant institutions, and educating the public through online and offline channels. Social media oversight faces several challenges, including the speed at which content spreads, anonymous accounts, evolving forms of content, jurisdictional limitations, and the limited technical capacity of election supervisors. False information may circulate more rapidly than the clarification process. Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency should therefore establish a rapid response mechanism encompassing content identification, verification, legal classification, institutional coordination, publication of clarifications, and documentation of follow up actions.

[35] Annisa, "Mitigasi Kampanye Hoaks dalam Pemilihan Gubernur dan Wakil Gubernur 2024 di Bawaslu Provinsi Jawa Barat," *Jurnal Keadilan Pemilu* 5, no. 2 (2024): 188–189, https://doi.org/10.55108/jkp.v5i2.489.

Łabuz and Nehring explain that deepfakes can undermine trust in democratic processes, especially elections.[36] Digital manipulation does not always alter electoral outcomes directly, but it may cumulatively erode trust in information, candidates, electoral institutions, and the electoral process. This finding broadens the scope of the constraints identified in North Lampung. Oversight should address not only written hoaxes but also manipulated images, audio, and video. Digital literacy initiatives should teach citizens how to verify sources, cross check information, identify manipulated content, and report problematic material. Bawaslu should also develop networks with local media, universities, digital communities, and civil society organizations to ensure that clarifications reach affected communities promptly.

12. Model for Strengthening the Preventive Authority of Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency

Based on the findings as a whole, efforts to strengthen the preventive authority of Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency can be formulated as the Integrated Vulnerability and Outcome Based Prevention Model, which comprises six components. First, dynamic vulnerability mapping. The mapping should extend to the subdistrict and village levels and be updated at each electoral stage. The data should encompass previous electoral violations, geographical characteristics, transport accessibility, voter data, participation levels, electoral contestant activities, and digital vulnerabilities. Second, tiered oversight based on standardized procedures. Subdistrict Election Supervisory Committees, Ward/Village Election Supervisors (PKD), and Polling Station Supervisors (PTPS) should receive guidelines specifying the objects of oversight, indicators of violations, documentation procedures, reporting deadlines, and consultation channels. Their capacity should be strengthened through case simulations and periodic evaluations.

Third, community based prevention. The Kampung Pengawasan (Electoral Oversight Village), Pojok Pengawasan (Electoral Oversight Corner), citizen forums, and voter education programs should target areas with high levels of electoral vulnerability and low levels of public participation in electoral oversight. These programs should involve religious leaders, customary leaders, youth, women, universities, the media, and civil society organizations. Fourth, follow up oriented coordination. Coordination with the General Elections Commission (KPU), local government, the police, the prosecution service, civil service agencies, the media, and civil society organizations should produce a clear division of responsibilities, response deadlines, and documented follow up

[36] Mateusz Łabuz and Christopher Nehring, "On the Way to Deep Fake Democracy? Deep Fakes in Election Campaigns in 2023," *European Political Science* 23 (2024): 454–456, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-024-00482-9.

measures. Fifth, an integrated data and rapid response system. Bawaslu requires a database that integrates vulnerability mapping, advisories, directives, oversight findings, information from the public, recommendations for corrective action, follow up measures, and the recurrence of violations. The system should support prompt responses to field reports and digital content.

Sixth, outcome based evaluation. Prevention performance should not be measured solely by the number of activities conducted. Relevant indicators should include the percentage of advisories complied with, recommendations for corrective action that are implemented, voter data accuracy, the number of public reports that can be verified, response time, reductions in repeated violations, and changes in vulnerability levels. The findings addressing the second research question indicate that the constraints faced by Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency include the extensive geographical area and limited transport access, an insufficient number of election supervisors, low public participation, covert vote buying, continuously changing voter data, the neutrality of public officials, and the spread of hoaxes and disinformation. Measures undertaken to address these constraints include tiered oversight, technical guidance, public outreach, Kampung Pengawasan, Pojok Pengawasan, Public Complaint Posts, voter data oversight, inter agency coordination, and digital literacy initiatives. These measures should be strengthened through more systematic and measurable vulnerability mapping, standardized supervisory procedures, community empowerment, an integrated data system, follow up oriented coordination, and outcome based evaluation.

CONCLUSION

This study demonstrates that Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency has exercised its preventive authority within the legal framework governing general elections through electoral vulnerability mapping, the issuance of advisories and directives, tiered oversight, voter data oversight, participatory oversight, and inter agency coordination. These practices demonstrate consistency between the authority conferred by statutory regulations and the institutional practices of Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency. However, this study cannot conclude that all these mechanisms have achieved substantive effectiveness because the available data primarily document activity outputs rather than measurable prevention outcomes.

The conceptual contribution of this study lies in distinguishing between prevention outputs and outcomes. The number of advisories, public outreach activities, oversight forums, coordination activities, and monitoring posts represents activity outputs. By contrast, increased compliance, the implementation of recommendations for corrective

action, reduced recurrence of electoral violations, the realization of voting rights, and changes in vulnerability levels constitute substantive outcomes. Based on this distinction, this study proposes the Integrated Vulnerability and Outcome Based Prevention Model, which links vulnerability mapping, priority setting, preventive measures, follow up actions, and outcome evaluation. At the institutional level, this approach encourages Bawaslu to develop an oversight system oriented not only toward the number of activities conducted but also toward changes in compliance and the risk of electoral violations.

This study has several limitations because its empirical data were obtained from three key informants and the available electoral oversight documents. It also lacks quantitative and longitudinal data that would allow the relationship between preventive measures and changes in the number and patterns of electoral violations to be measured. Accordingly, the findings are not intended to establish causal relationships or to be generalized to all regency and municipal Bawaslu offices in Indonesia. Future research should conduct comparative studies across regions and use data covering multiple electoral stages or electoral cycles to examine the relationships among vulnerability levels, preventive measures, compliance, and changes in the incidence of electoral violations.

Bawaslu of North Lampung Regency should develop an outcome based prevention evaluation framework that measures compliance with advisories, the percentage of recommendations for corrective action that receive follow up, response times, the quality of public participation, the recurrence of electoral violations, and changes in vulnerability levels. These data should be integrated with vulnerability mapping so that oversight resources and measures can be prioritized in areas and electoral stages facing higher risks. Future research should test the Integrated Vulnerability and Outcome Based Prevention Model across several regency and municipal Bawaslu offices using quantitative, longitudinal, and comparative data. Such research would enable a more robust assessment of the substantive effectiveness of Bawaslu's preventive authority.

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