INDEPENDENSI LEMBAGA PERADILAN DI TENGAH INTERVENSI KEKUASAAN STUDI TERHADAP RELASI HUKUM DAN POLITIK DI INDONESIA

Authors

  • Gradios Nyoman Tio Rae Universitas Bung Karno, Jakarta, Indonesia

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24252/iqtishaduna.v7i4.69552

Abstract

ABSTRAK

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis bentuk dan pola intervensi kekuasaan politik terhadap independensi lembaga peradilan di Indonesia, serta implikasinya terhadap relasi antara hukum dan politik dalam sistem ketatanegaraan Indonesia. Independensi peradilan merupakan prasyarat tegaknya negara hukum sebagaimana dijamin Pasal 24 ayat (1) UUD NRI Tahun 1945, namun jaminan normatif tersebut menghadapi tantangan dalam praktik, khususnya melalui politisasi seleksi hakim agung dan hakim konstitusi, ketidakpastian masa jabatan, ketergantungan anggaran pada APBN, serta tekanan nonformal dari opini publik dan kelompok kepentingan.  Penelitian ini menggunakan metode penelitian hukum normatif dengan pendekatan perundang-undangan, konseptual, dan kasus, menggunakan bahan hukum primer berupa peraturan perundang-undangan dan putusan pengadilan, serta bahan hukum sekunder berupa literatur dan jurnal yang relevan, dianalisis secara deduktif melalui interpretasi sistematis dan teleologis. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa intervensi terhadap independensi peradilan tidak selalu berbentuk instruksi langsung, melainkan bekerja secara struktural melalui mekanisme pengisian jabatan, pengaturan kelembagaan, dan ketergantungan administratif, sebagaimana tercermin dalam kasus penggantian Hakim Konstitusi Aswanto oleh DPR. Kondisi ini menegaskan bahwa batas antara pengawasan kelembagaan yang sah dan intervensi yang merusak objektivitas yudisial masih kabur dalam relasi antara Mahkamah Agung, Mahkamah Konstitusi, dan Komisi Yudisial. Penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa independensi peradilan harus dipahami sebagai proyek kelembagaan berkelanjutan yang memerlukan rekrutmen berbasis merit, jaminan keamanan masa jabatan, kemandirian anggaran, penguatan integritas hakim, dan akuntabilitas yang proporsional agar kekuasaan kehakiman dapat berfungsi sebagai pembatas kekuasaan politik, bukan sebaliknya.

Kata Kunci: Independensi Peradilan, Intervensi Politik, Relasi Hukum Dan Politik

 

ABSTRACT

This study aims to analyze the forms and patterns of political power intervention against judicial independence in Indonesia, as well as its implications for the relationship between law and politics within Indonesia's constitutional system. Judicial independence is a fundamental prerequisite for upholding the rule of law as guaranteed under Article 24 paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, yet this normative guarantee faces practical challenges, particularly through the politicization of the selection process for Supreme Court and Constitutional Court justices, uncertainty regarding tenure security, budgetary dependence on the state budget, and informal pressures from public opinion and interest groups. This research employs a normative legal method using statutory, conceptual, and case-based approaches, drawing on primary legal materials such as legislation and court decisions, as well as secondary legal materials including relevant literature and journals, analyzed deductively through systematic and teleological interpretation. The findings indicate that intervention against judicial independence does not always take the form of direct instructions but rather operates structurally through appointment mechanisms, institutional arrangements, and administrative dependency, as reflected in the House of Representatives' removal of Constitutional Court Justice Aswanto. This condition confirms that the boundary between legitimate institutional oversight and intervention undermining judicial objectivity remains unclear in the relationship between the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, and the Judicial Commission. This study concludes that judicial independence must be understood as an ongoing institutional project requiring merit-based recruitment, tenure security guarantees, budgetary autonomy, strengthened judicial integrity, and proportionate accountability, so that judicial power can function as a check on political power rather than becoming its instrument.

Keywords: Judicial Independence, Political Intervention, Law-Politics Relationship.

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Published

2026-06-26

Issue

Section

Volume 7 Nomor 4 Juli 2026