



MAZAHIBUNA: Jurnal Perbandingan Mazhab

Volume 8 Number 2 August 2026; 389-413

P-ISSN: 2685-6905; E-ISSN: 2685-7812

DOI: 10.24252/mazahibuna.vi.70543

<http://journal.uin-alauddin.ac.id/index.php/mjpm>

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License

Pragmatic Islamism and the Reconfiguration of Islamic Politics: The Political Trajectory of PKS

Rendy Adiwilaga^{1*}, Zuly Qodir², Taufiqur Rahman³, Mahmood shaker Abood Alaloosh⁴

¹Bale Bandung University, Indonesia. E-mail: rendiadiwilaga@unibba.ac.id

²Department of Islamic Politics, Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta, Indonesia. E-mail: zuliqody@umy.ac.id

³Department of Communication Science, Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta, Indonesia. E-mail: taufiqurrahman@umy.ac.id

⁴College of Management and Economics, University of Kirkuk, Iraq. E-mail: mahmoodshaker@uokirkuk.edu.iq

*Corresponding Author

[Received: March 18, 2026] [Reviewed: May 30, 2026] [Revised: July 01, 2026] [Accepted: July 15, 2026] [Published: August 13, 2026]

How to Cite:

Adiwilaga, R., Qodir, Z., Rahman, T., & Alaloosh, M. shaker A. (2026). Pragmatic Islamism and the Reconfiguration of Islamic Politics: The Political Trajectory of PKS. *Mazahibuna: Jurnal Perbandingan Mazhab*. 8 (2): 389-413. <https://doi.org/10.24252/mazahibuna.vi.70543>

Abstract

As a political entity, the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) occupies a complex ideological position within post-Reformasi Indonesian politics. While the party maintains a commitment to Islamic values and emerged from the Islamist Jemaah Tarbiyah movement, it simultaneously participates actively in democratic elections, coalition politics, and contemporary governance. This combination creates a conceptual gap in existing scholarship, as PKS cannot be fully explained either by conventional Islamism or by post-Islamism. This study examines how PKS's ideological orientation should be understood within these competing frameworks and proposes a conceptual refinement to explain its hybrid trajectory. The study employs a qualitative narrative literature review combined with conceptual analysis. Relevant literature was primarily retrieved from the Scopus database using keywords related to Islamism, post-Islamism, Political Islam, PKS, and Indonesia, supplemented by seminal books and highly cited publications. The analysis finds that PKS retains core Islamist commitments, including the normative importance of Islamic values and gradual aspirations for their institutionalization, while pragmatically adapting to democratic institutions, electoral competition, coalition-building, and contemporary governance. Based on these findings, this article proposes the concept of Pragmatic Islamism, characterized by the preservation of Islamist normative commitments alongside democratic participation, electoral pragmatism, and gradual, non-confrontational approaches to the implementation of Islamic values. The concept contributes to the study of Islamic politics and jurisprudential debates by offering an analytical framework for understanding hybrid forms of Islamist political engagement in contemporary democratic contexts.

Keywords: Islamism; Post-Islamism; Prosperous Justice Party; Pragmatic Islamism; Islamic Politic.



Copyrights © 2026 The Author (s). Published by *Mazahibuna: Jurnal Perbandingan Mazhab*. This article is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original authors and

source are properly credited.

Abstract

Sebagai entitas politik, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) menempati posisi ideologis yang kompleks dalam politik Indonesia pasca-Reformasi. Meskipun partai ini mempertahankan komitmen terhadap nilai-nilai Islam dan berakar dari gerakan Islamis Jemaah Tarbiyah, PKS secara bersamaan berpartisipasi aktif dalam pemilu demokratis, politik koalisi, dan tata kelola pemerintahan kontemporer. Kombinasi tersebut menciptakan kesenjangan konseptual dalam kajian yang ada, karena PKS tidak sepenuhnya dapat dijelaskan baik melalui kerangka Islamisme konvensional maupun post-Islamisme. Penelitian ini mengkaji bagaimana orientasi ideologis PKS seharusnya dipahami dalam kerangka yang saling berkompetisi tersebut serta mengusulkan penyempurnaan konseptual untuk menjelaskan trajektori hibridnya. Penelitian ini menggunakan tinjauan literatur naratif kualitatif yang dipadukan dengan analisis konseptual. Literatur yang relevan terutama diperoleh dari basis data Scopus dengan menggunakan kata kunci yang berkaitan dengan Islamisme, post-Islamisme, Islam politik, PKS, dan Indonesia, yang dilengkapi dengan buku-buku seminal serta publikasi yang memiliki tingkat sitasi tinggi. Hasil analisis menunjukkan bahwa PKS tetap mempertahankan komitmen inti Islamis, termasuk pentingnya nilai-nilai Islam secara normatif dan aspirasi gradual untuk menginstitusionalisasikannya, sekaligus beradaptasi secara pragmatis dengan institusi demokrasi, kompetisi elektoral, pembentukan koalisi, dan tata kelola pemerintahan kontemporer. Berdasarkan temuan tersebut, artikel ini mengusulkan konsep Islamisme Pragmatis (Pragmatic Islamism), yang ditandai oleh pelestarian komitmen normatif Islamis bersamaan dengan partisipasi demokratis, pragmatisme elektoral, serta pendekatan gradual dan non-konfrontatif dalam implementasi nilai-nilai Islam. Konsep ini berkontribusi terhadap kajian politik Islam dan perdebatan fikih dengan menawarkan kerangka analitis untuk memahami bentuk-bentuk hibrida keterlibatan politik Islamis dalam konteks demokrasi kontemporer.

Keywords: Islamisme; Politik Islam; Post-Islamisme; Partai Keadilan Sejahtera; Islamisme Pragmatis.

Introduction

As an alternative, or even an antithesis, to mainstream Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, the Prosperous Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, PKS) has emerged as one of the principal actors in the discourse on Islamic politics in Indonesia. Since its declaration in the post-Soeharto era, the Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan*), the predecessor of PKS, has attracted considerable scholarly attention due to its roots in the *tarbiyah* movement, a network of Muslim student activists. Unlike mainstream Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, which developed from long-standing indigenous religious traditions, the *tarbiyah* movement represented a distinct political current. According to several scholars, it instrumentalized Islam primarily as a symbolic resource to advance a pragmatic political agenda. (Z. Qodir, 2023; Qodir & Misran, 2022; Rokhmad, 2014).

On the other hand, PKS maintains a highly disciplined, well-organized, and structured cadre recruitment system. Unlike other Islamic-oriented political parties, PKS imposes more stringent recruitment requirements. The party even requires every cadre seeking nomination for legislative or regional executive office to memorize at least one juz of the Qur'an, a requirement that is not imposed by other Islamic political parties. However, this cadre development system, which is deeply rooted in Sharia principles, does not always correspond to the party's political trajectory, which frequently reflects a

pragmatic orientation. This tension between ideological commitment and political pragmatism has generated conceptual ambiguity over whether PKS should be classified as an Islamist party or as a post-Islamist political actor that is more receptive to ideas beyond conventional Islamist doctrine.


The pragmatism of the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan, PK), which later transformed into the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), was evident in its political maneuvering during the early Post-Soeharto period. One notable manifestation was the party's decision to recruit members from outside the *tarbiyah* movement. During the 2004 general election, PKS reportedly nominated more than thirty non-Muslim legislative candidates. In addition, the party also accepted non-Muslims as members. This was reflected in the establishment of the Paniai Regency Branch Executive Board (DPD) of the Justice Party on 5 June 2002, whose executive committee was predominantly composed of Christians. Furthermore, PKS leaders extended opportunities to prominent Hindu figures to run as legislative candidates. This was particularly evident during the party's National Working Meeting (*Musyawarah Kerja Nasional*, Mukernas) held in Bali on 1–3 February 2008, when Fahri Hamzah invited Ida Pedanda Sebali Tianyar, a prominent Balinese Hindu religious leader, to stand as a legislative candidate under the PKS banner. (Basyir, 2014).

Although the Justice Party (PK) failed to surpass the electoral threshold in the 1999 general election, the party responded by undertaking organizational restructuring and re-emerging as the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) (Machmudi, 2008). The transformation marked the beginning of a more pragmatic political strategy. In the 2004 general election, PKS secured 8,325,020 votes (7.34% of the national vote), representing a dramatic increase from its 1.36% vote share in 1999 (KPU, 2023). This pragmatic repositioning not only restored the party's electoral competitiveness but also became the defining strategy of PKS in subsequent elections.

During the 2004 general election campaign, PKS continued to present Sharia as a central element of its political platform and public appeal. The party campaigned on issues such as combating corruption, promoting justice, and advancing clean and good governance, presenting these commitments as measurable indicators of its political credibility. However, by the 2009 general election, PKS had become less inclined to foreground its commitment to the implementation of Sharia or to position itself within more overtly ideological debates. Instead, the party adopted a more pragmatic electoral strategy aimed at broadening its electoral support and expanding its constituent base (Azizah, 2012).

The following presents the development of PKS's electoral vote share across successive general elections:

Figure 1. Development of PKS's electoral vote share across successive general elections



Source: Centrak Statistics Agency (BPS)

Additional Information:
General Elections

Overall, PKS's electoral performance remained relatively stable and even improved between the 1999 and 2009 general elections. However, as shown in Figure 1, the party experienced a significant decline in the 2014 election. This downturn was attributable not only to the broader decline in public support for Islamic political parties but also to a series of scandals involving prominent PKS figures. These included the controversy surrounding Arifinto, who was caught watching pornographic content during a parliamentary session in 2011, as well as the beef import quota corruption case involving the party's then president, Luthfi Hasan Ishaq ([Anawati & Al-Hamdi, 2020](#)). Consequently, PKS's reputation for integrity came under increasing public scrutiny, particularly given its long-standing efforts to portray itself as a clean and morally grounded Islamic political party.

The establishment of the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan, PK), and subsequently the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), in the aftermath of the 1998 Reformasi coincided with the resurgence of Islamism in a more assertive form. The *Reformasi* movement created a favorable political environment for Islamist movements, as supporters of political Islam, who had long been suppressed under the authoritarian regime, were finally able to express and promote their political aspirations openly ([Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014](#)). This political liberalization provided Islamist groups with unprecedented opportunities to expand their organizational networks and political influence after years of systematic repression. Under the New Order regime, political Islam frequently challenged the existing power structure, resulting in strained relations between

Islamic groups and the political authorities. Consequently, state violence against citizens associated with political Islam was not uncommon (Smith-Hefner, 2016).

The formalization of Islam within the state has been a central element of PKS's political discourse since the party's establishment (Hidayat, 2020). In practice, however, PKS has not consistently pursued this ideological objective. Unlike Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or organizations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, which prioritize religious preaching and ideological education while rejecting participation in democratic electoral politics, PKS has adopted a more pragmatic approach by participating in every general election since 1999, including the most recent election in 2024. Beyond electoral politics, PKS has also engaged with a range of contemporary issues, including women's empowerment (Miichi, 2020), political philanthropy (Qodir & Misran, 2022), and selected human rights issues, particularly its support for Palestine and its position on past human rights violations in Indonesia (Adiwilaga, 2023). These characteristics further complicate attempts to classify PKS exclusively as either an Islamist or a post-Islamist political party.

The concept of post-Islamism is introduced here because PKS's political behavior presents a conceptual puzzle. Unlike Islamism, which generally emphasizes the formal implementation of Sharia, ideological rigidity, and the primacy of religious authority in political life, post-Islamism is more receptive to contemporary values such as environmental protection, human rights, and political collaboration (Yilmaz et al., 2017). It therefore represents a significant departure from the conventional Islamist paradigm. This study begins from the preliminary proposition that PKS simultaneously incorporates elements of both ideological traditions.

Although PKS has consistently secured around 7–8% of the national vote, its electoral strength has been considerably more pronounced in several regional strongholds. For many years, the party dominated electoral politics in Depok City and established enduring support bases in West Sumatra and Riau. Together with West Java and West Nusa Tenggara, these provinces have long been recognized as PKS strongholds characterized by highly loyal and disciplined supporters. This pattern was evident in both the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections, when these provinces consistently delivered electoral victories for Prabowo Subianto, the presidential candidate supported by PKS in both contests. In addition, PKS has consistently ranked among the three largest parties in terms of legislative seats in the Jakarta Provincial House of Representatives (DPRD DKI Jakarta).

Existing scholarship has predominantly interpreted PKS either as an Islamist party or as an example of post-Islamism. While these perspectives provide valuable insights, they tend to position Islamism and post-Islamism as mutually exclusive analytical

categories, leaving limited conceptual space for political actors that simultaneously maintain Islamist commitments while pragmatically adapting to democratic politics. This unresolved tension constitutes the principal research gap addressed by this study.

Accordingly, this study aims to examine PKS's ideological trajectory within the theoretical debates on Islamism and post-Islamism and proposes the concept of Pragmatic Islamism as a conceptual refinement to explain political actors whose ideological orientation cannot be adequately captured by either framework alone. Specifically, this study addresses the following research question: How should PKS's ideological orientation be understood within the debates on Islamism and post-Islamism?

Methods

This study employs a qualitative narrative literature review combined with conceptual analysis to examine the ideological trajectory of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) within the debates on Islamism and post-Islamism. Relevant journal articles were identified through the Scopus database using combinations of the keywords "Islamism," "Post-Islamism," "Political Islam," "Prosperous Justice Party," "PKS," and "Indonesia." The literature search primarily covered publications from 1998 to 2025. To establish the theoretical foundation of the study, seminal books and highly cited publications were also incorporated where necessary. Only peer-reviewed journal articles (Q1–Q4) focusing on Asian contexts, particularly Indonesia, were included in the primary literature review.

The retrieved literature was organized using Mendeley reference management software. AI-assisted academic discovery tools, including Consensus, Scite, Elicit, and Typeset, were employed solely to facilitate literature identification and citation verification. The selected literature was analysed through thematic interpretation and comparative conceptual analysis to synthesize scholarly debates on Islamism and post-Islamism and to formulate the concept of *Pragmatic Islamism*.

Result and Discussion

Islamic Formalism and Islamic Substantialism: The Intellectual Nexus of Islamism and Post-Islamism in Indonesia

The discourse on Islamism fundamentally centers on the political, social, and economic articulation of religious symbols in the public sphere. In France, Islamist movements are commonly referred to as *Intégrisme*, while other scholars describe them as a form of fundamentalism (A'La et al., 2018). Greg Barton argues that Islamism encompasses a broad spectrum of beliefs. At one end of this spectrum are those who merely seek appropriate recognition of Islam within national life and state symbolism. At the other are those who advocate the radical transformation of society and politics into

an absolute theocracy by whatever means necessary (Barton, 2006). Despite these variations, all expressions of Islamism ultimately converge on a common ideological objective: the politicization of Islam to establish a Sharia-based state, typically pursued by non-state actors (Tibi, 2012).

Tibi further argues that Islamism is a political ideology grounded in a reconstructed interpretation of Islamic law rather than in the religious faith of Islam itself, and is therefore frequently characterized as a totalitarian ideology. The notion of a "reconstructed" interpretation refers to contemporary readings of Islamic law that tend to be textualist and rigid, distinguishing Islamism from Islam as a religious tradition grounded in broader ethical and spiritual principles. From this perspective, Islamism represents a political reinterpretation of Islam in which religious doctrines are instrumentalized to advance ideological and political objectives (Tibi, 2012).

From the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence, however, this reconstruction should not be understood as a direct continuation of the classical tradition of *fiqh siyāsah* or *siyāsah shar'iyyah*. Classical Islamic political jurisprudence primarily emphasizes justice ('*adl*), public welfare (*maṣlaḥah*), consultation (*shūrā*), and the ethical responsibilities of political authority rather than prescribing a single model of the Islamic state. Likewise, the tradition of *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* focuses on achieving the higher objectives of Islamic law, including the protection of religion, life, intellect, lineage, and property. By contrast, many Islamist movements selectively reinterpret these classical doctrines to legitimize modern political projects centered on the institutionalization of Sharia within the framework of the contemporary nation-state. Islamism should therefore be understood not as classical Islamic jurisprudence itself, but as a modern ideological reconstruction that appropriates elements of the Islamic legal tradition to address contemporary political challenges.

From a more critical perspective, Ungureanu defines Islamism as a political and religious utopia constructed by the Arab-Muslim world as an ideological alternative to modern Western doctrines. In this view, anti-Occidentalism emerges as a by-product of resistance to secularization, materialism, and perceived moral decline (Ungureanu, 2008). By characterizing Islamism as a "utopia," Ungureanu emphasizes its highly idealized and arguably unattainable aspirations. He further argues that Islamism is a product of the Arab-Muslim world, developed as an intellectual and ideological counterpoint to dominant Western concepts within the social and political sciences.

Another critical perspective is offered by Berman (2003), who argues that the rise of Islamism in the Muslim world is closely associated with the declining effectiveness and legitimacy of the state. According to Berman, the expansion of Islamist movements within civil society reflects political failure and serves as an incubator for illiberal radicalism. (Berman, 2003). His argument suggests that Islamism should not be regarded as a

politically neutral phenomenon; rather, its emergence constitutes a negative indicator of state failure. Nevertheless, the expansion of Islamism cannot be attributed to a single cause. As Ismail (2004) observes, Muslim and Islamist identities interact, converge, and diverge under the influence of multiple factors, including modernity, postmodernity, socio-economic position, gender, age, and lifestyle (Ismail, 2004).

In a similar vein, Vedi Hadiz using a different but closely related concept, Islamic populism, argues that Islamic populism emerges from competition among diverse Islamic political currents as part of contemporary struggles over power and material resources across different social and historical contexts. Unlike conventional understandings of Islamism, Hadiz emphasizes the socio-economic and political conditions that give rise to Islamic mobilization rather than focusing solely on religious ideology (Hadiz, 2016).

Subsequent studies have further developed this perspective by linking Islamic populism to the historical experiences of injustice and marginalization faced by Muslim communities at both the global and local levels since the colonial era, as well as to their efforts to challenge these conditions (Hara & Trihartono, 2019). Other scholars have observed that Islamic populist movements frequently mobilize the Muslim middle class as their principal leaders and social base (Yusuf et al., 2022). Moreover, Islamic populism may ultimately evolve into political projects aimed at establishing a Sharia-based state through democratic processes (Arif & Wardhani, 2023).

Taken together, these studies suggest that Hadiz's conception of Islamic populism highlights the interaction between political competition, socio-economic grievances, and Islamic identity, while demonstrating how democratic institutions may serve as vehicles for advancing Islamist political objectives.

Whereas Berman views the rise of Islamism as a consequence of state failure and Sayyid associates it with the crisis of Eurocentrism, Olivier Roy shifts the focus by offering a critique of Islamism itself. Roy (1996) argues that Islamist movements have gradually lost their revolutionary impulse to capture state power. Instead, they have evolved into what he terms neo-fundamentalism—a form of moral activism that prioritizes the enforcement of Islamic ethical norms over the creation of new political institutions or the establishment of an Islamic state. According to Roy, this new tendency operates primarily within the social and personal spheres rather than through direct political transformation.

Extending Roy's critique of Islamism's internal transformation, the Indonesian experience presents a distinctive trajectory. While Islamism in Indonesia has often attracted concern due to the emergence of radical and extremist groups that have complicated the country's political and security landscape (Wanandi, 2002). subsequent developments suggest a more nuanced pattern. Sakai and Fauzia (2014) argue that many Indonesian Muslims have gradually shifted away from formal political Islam toward socio-

cultural expressions of Islam that emphasize religious morality and civic engagement rather than state-centered political projects (Sakai & Fauzia, 2014). This trend closely resembles the dynamics of post-Islamism observed in other parts of the Muslim world. Despite these developments, Indonesia continues to be widely recognized for its relatively moderate Islamic landscape, with major Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama playing a pivotal role in sustaining religious moderation (Darajat, 2017).

Focusing specifically on the Indonesian context, Hakim et al. (2023) conceptualizes Islamism as a political movement that seeks to institutionalize Islamic values across public life, encompassing the political, social, and economic spheres. Rather than viewing Islamism merely as an expression of individual religiosity, Hakim argues that it represents a broader project aimed at reshaping social and political order according to particular interpretations of Islam. Hakim further contends that the significance of Islamism in Indonesia increased considerably following the collapse of the New Order regime. Political liberalization after 1998 created greater opportunities for the public expression of Islamic identity and facilitated the emergence of diverse Islamist movements. These movements encompass a broad ideological spectrum, ranging from relatively moderate organizations that operate within democratic institutions to more radical groups advocating far-reaching political transformation (Hakim, 2023).

In response to the perceived limitations of Islamism, a number of moderate Muslim intellectuals introduced the concept of post-Islamism as an alternative analytical framework. How, then, does post-Islamism differ from Islamism? Asef Bayat argues that post-Islamism emerged from the exhaustion of political Islam, a condition reflected in the growing number of Islamic political parties that gradually abandoned the project of establishing an Islamic state in favor of participating in democratic politics and competing for state power (Bayat, 2013). Rather than representing a complete departure from Islamism, post-Islamism constitutes a fluid and adaptive orientation characterized by a gradual shift in Islamist discourse and political practice toward democracy, political pluralism, and power-sharing. As Imad (2019) notes, the legitimacy and credibility of post-Islamism are shaped by the diverse political conditions, constraints, and realistic trajectories experienced across the Arab and Muslim worlds (Imad, 2019).

Beyond defining Islamism as an ideology and political movement seeking to establish an Islamic social and political order—whether through an Islamic state, the implementation of Sharia, or the enforcement of Islamic moral codes—Bayat conceptualizes post-Islamism as an attempt to reconcile religiosity with rights, faith with freedom, and Islam with democracy. In his formulation, post-Islamism reverses several core premises of Islamism by emphasizing rights rather than obligations, pluralism instead of a single authoritative voice, historical contextualization over scriptural literalism, and

future-oriented political engagement rather than nostalgia for the past. It seeks to reconcile Islam with individual choice, democracy, and modernity while acknowledging the necessity of secular institutions, intellectual openness, and the rejection of exclusive religious truth claims. Consequently, whereas Islamism prioritizes the fusion of religion and political obligation, post-Islamism places greater emphasis on religiosity, individual rights, and democratic citizenship. Nevertheless, although it supports a civil and non-theocratic state, post-Islamism continues to recognize a meaningful public role for religion (Bayat, 2013).

Drawing primarily on the Iranian experience, Bayat (2005; 2013) conceptualizes post-Islamism as a condition of the secularization of religion that emerged from the limitations and exhaustion of the Islamist project. However, Bayat emphasizes that post-Islamism should not be understood simply as the end of Islamism. Rather, it represents the emergence of a qualitatively different discourse and political project that evolves out of the historical experience of Islamism itself. As he explains:

"The emergence of post-Islamism does not necessarily signal the end of Islamism. Rather, it signifies the birth, out of the experience of Islamism, of a qualitatively different discourse and politics. Indeed, for some time we may witness the simultaneous processes of Islamization and post-Islamization" (Bayat, 2013)

This formulation suggests that Islamism and post-Islamism should not be understood as two mutually exclusive categories. Instead, they may coexist simultaneously, with elements of both appearing within the same political movement or historical period. Such a perspective provides an important theoretical basis for examining political actors whose ideological orientation cannot be fully explained by either Islamism or post-Islamism alone.

The concept of post-Islamism continues to evolve alongside the changing trajectories of Islamic politics. As Cavatorta and Merone (2015) demonstrate through the case of Tunisia's Ennahda Movement, the legitimacy of the Islamic state remains embedded in religious discourse and interpretation, even as Islamist actors increasingly adapt to democratic institutions and political pluralism. In this regard, post-Islamism does not necessarily abandon Islamic political aspirations; rather, it reinterprets them within a more pragmatic and democratic framework (Cavatorta & Merone, 2015).

Similarly, Mahdavi (2019) argues that post-Islamism reflects the changing social and political conditions of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), promoting the idea of a civil state while gradually moving away from the traditional notion of an Islamic state and encouraging the emergence of multiple forms of Muslim modernity (Mahdavi, 2019). Accordingly, post-Islamism can be understood as a dynamic political phenomenon that

seeks to reconcile Islamic values with democratic governance, political compromise, and public legitimacy without insisting upon the rigid implementation of Sharia as the exclusive foundation of the state (Karim, 2021).

This raises an important question: does post-Islamism represent a transition from Islamism, or does it replace Islamism altogether? Dokhanchi (2020) offers a compelling response by arguing that post-Islamism should be understood not as the abandonment of Islamism, but rather as its reconfiguration. In his view, post-Islamism preserves the ethical foundations of Islamism while rejecting its authoritarian tendencies and universalist claims, as illustrated by developments in Iran and other postmodern Muslim contexts. (Dokhanchi, 2020).

Conceptually and politically, the shift from Islamism to post-Islamism does not constitute a wholesale rejection of Islamist thought. Rather, it represents a critical reassessment of Islamist activism in light of its perceived limitations in governance, political mobilization, and state-building. From this perspective, post-Islamism emerged as an effort to reconcile Islamic political ideals with the practical realities of democracy, pluralism, and contemporary governance. Consequently, religion is no longer viewed solely as an instrument for establishing an Islamic state but increasingly as a moral and ethical resource capable of coexisting with democratic institutions and political compromise.

As Karim (2021) argues, post-Islamism has extended beyond academic discourse to become evident in the everyday lives of Muslims and even in popular culture. This development reflects an ongoing process in which religious values are continuously reinterpreted and renegotiated within democratic, secular, and pluralistic public spheres. Rather than disappearing from politics, religion adapts to changing social and political contexts through new forms of engagement and meaning-making (Karim, 2021).

Thus, the fundamental differences between Islamism and post-Islamism can be explained, as summarized in the following table:

Table 1. Differences between Islamism and Post-Islamism

Variabel Instrument	Islamism	Post-Islamism	Explanation
Formalization of Sharia in the state	√	×	Islamism essentially aspires to the full implementation of Islamic law within the state, whereas post-Islamism rejects the rigid application of Sharia.
Use of Islamic symbols in	√	×	Islamism, in line with Sharia formalization, emphasizes Islamic symbols that must

movement propaganda		penetrate private spheres of society, while post-Islamism pays less attention to such symbols.	
Movement Model	Rigid, inflexible, and potentially employing extreme (violent) and radical methods (Mozaffari, 2007)	Soft, emphasizing dialogue, not concentrated on coercion	
Stance on Western issues (Democracy, Human Rights, LGBT)	Opposed	Supportive	Islamist groups tend to be less aware of or enthusiastic about human rights issues and may oppose principles of democracy and LGBT rights, whereas post-Islamist groups are open to dialogue on these topics and tend to focus on individual rights and democracy (Khairullin, 2022a)

Source: Researcher’s compilation from various sources, 2024


These ideological debates have, directly and indirectly, shaped the trajectory of Islamic politics in Indonesia. Zuly Qodir (2012) categorizes these competing intellectual traditions into two broad orientations: Islamic formalism and Islamic substantialism. Islamic formalism advocates the institutionalization of Islam as the ideological foundation of the Indonesian state. From this perspective, Pancasila is regarded as a human-made ideology that may be altered according to political circumstances, whereas Islam is understood as a divine and immutable source of political legitimacy. Consequently, proponents of Islamic formalism argue that the state should be founded upon Islamic principles to ensure justice, prosperity, and divine blessing for society. Within this framework, maintaining Pancasila as the sole ideological foundation of the state is viewed as incompatible with the supremacy of Islamic teachings (Qodir, 2012). One of the most prominent advocates of this perspective was Mohammad Natsir, a leading figure of the Masyumi Party during the Sukarno era.

In contrast, Islamic substantialism maintains that the state does not need to adopt Islam formally as its constitutional or ideological foundation. Instead, it emphasizes the substantive ethical values of Islam as guiding principles for public governance and state administration. According to this perspective, the formal institutionalization of religion risks reducing Islam to a narrow legalistic interpretation defined by particular religious authorities, thereby undermining its universal ethical message (Qodir, 2012). Islamic substantialism further recognizes that while Islam is one religion, it accommodates diverse interpretations and expressions. Consequently, this perspective stands in opposition to Islamic formalism by advocating the integration of Islamic values into public life without requiring the formal establishment of an Islamic state.

Comparative Trajectories of Islamism: Toward the Indonesian Experience

Traditionally, Islamism has been understood as a political ideology that extends Islam beyond personal faith into the organization of the modern state, seeking to shape governance, law, education, and social order according to Islamic principles (Bubalo, 2005). Expanding upon this perspective, Armajani identifies at least four fundamental principles that underpin Islamist thought. First, Islamic principles should serve as the primary guide for both individual and collective life. Second, Islam is regarded as the only religion possessing complete and universal truth, whereas other religious traditions are viewed as either erroneous or possessing only limited validity. Third, traditional Islamic law should regulate issues concerning gender relations and sexual morality. Fourth, Western culture and secularism are perceived as promoting consumerism and permissive lifestyles that are fundamentally incompatible with Islamic values (Adiwilaga, 2017b).

In the Indonesian context, Qodir further distinguishes Islamism into two broad orientations: Islamic formalism, which emphasizes the symbolic manifestation of Islamic identity, and Islamic Shari'atism, which prioritizes the institutionalization of Sharia through legal and constitutional mechanisms. Together, these perspectives demonstrate that Islamism is not a monolithic ideology but encompasses multiple strategies for relating Islam to politics. Zuli Qodir (2012) proposes a framework that illustrates the ideological development of Islamism, as presented below:



Picture 2. Islamism and its Derivatives

Source: (Qodir, 2023)

As illustrated in Picture 2, Qodir classifies contemporary Islamism into two principal orientations: Islamic formalism, which emphasizes the symbolic manifestation of Islamic identity in political and social life, and Islamic Shari'atism, which prioritizes the juridical institutionalization of Sharia through state mechanisms. Together, these orientations demonstrate that Islamism in Indonesia encompasses both symbolic and institutional strategies for advancing Islamic political objectives.

Comparative experiences from Iran, Turkey, and Tunisia further illustrate the diversity of Islamist trajectories. Iran represents the institutionalization of Islamism through revolutionary state formation, whereas Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP) demonstrates the adaptation of Islamist politics to democratic competition. Similarly, Tunisia's Ennahda Movement has increasingly embraced constitutional democracy while maintaining its Islamic identity, making it one of the most widely discussed examples of post-Islamism. These cases indicate that Islamist movements are capable of adapting to different political environments without necessarily abandoning their ideological foundations. (Asisian, 2016; Yilmaz et al., 2017; Haryanto et al., 2018; Ben Lazreg, 2021)

Indonesia presents a distinct trajectory. Rather than following either the Iranian model of state-centered Islamism or the Tunisian model of post-Islamism, Islamist movements have developed through diverse organizational forms and political strategies. While some groups continue to advocate the formal implementation of Sharia or even a transnational caliphate, others increasingly pursue Islamic objectives through democratic participation and electoral politics (Munabari et al., 2020). This diversity suggests that neither Islamism nor post-Islamism alone adequately captures the ideological trajectory of Indonesian Islamist actors, particularly PKS, whose political behavior combines enduring

Islamist commitments with pragmatic democratic adaptation. This conceptual tension provides the foundation for proposing the concept of Pragmatic Islamism.

PKS: Political Instrumentalization or Genuine Islamic Commitment?

According to Bubalo, (2005) contemporary Islamist movements can be broadly categorized into two major currents: the mainstream and the militant. Mainstream Islamists seek the establishment of an Islamic state as their long-term objective but pursue this goal through gradual social reform and participation in democratic institutions. Rather than rejecting electoral politics outright, they regard democratic processes as legitimate political arenas through which Islamic values can progressively shape state institutions and public life. The Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is frequently cited as one of the most prominent examples of this trajectory.

In contrast, the militant current is characterized by a more confrontational and revolutionary approach to political change. Associated most prominently with the thought of Sayyid Qutb, this tradition argues that the Islamization of society can only be achieved through the complete overthrow of what Qutb described as *jahiliyyah*—a condition of moral, political, and social ignorance that extends beyond the pre-Islamic era to encompass contemporary secular societies. In his influential work *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* (*Milestones*), Qutb outlines the necessity of establishing a revolutionary vanguard committed to transforming society according to Islamic principles, an approach that has often been compared by scholars to Leninist notions of revolutionary political organization (Sultan et al., 2022; Adiwilaga, 2017b). Despite their differences in strategy and political methodology, both mainstream and militant Islamists share a common aspiration: the institutionalization of Islam as the normative foundation of political and public life. Their divergence lies not in the ultimate objective, but in the methods through which that objective is pursued.

Although Islamist movements advocating the establishment of an Islamic state or the formal institutionalization of Islamic law had existed long before Indonesia's independence, Islamist political activism experienced renewed momentum following the democratic transition of 1998. Nevertheless, several scholars argue that the electoral strength of political Islam has remained relatively limited. As Wahyu observes, public support for Islamic political parties has fluctuated across successive general elections, accounting for 36.7% of the vote in 1999, 38.3% in 2004, 29.2% in 2009, and 31.4% in 2014. Despite modest gains in several elections, these figures remain considerably lower than the electoral support achieved by the Masyumi Party in the 1955 general election, when it secured 43.5% of the national vote (Argenti et al., 2022).

However, the relatively modest electoral performance of Islamic political parties should not be interpreted as evidence of the decline of Islamism itself. Rather, Islamist actors have continued to adapt their strategies and modes of political engagement within Indonesia's democratic system. As Bayat argues, Islamist movements have increasingly recognized that the establishment of an Islamic state is unlikely to be achieved under authoritarian secular regimes, thereby encouraging greater engagement with democratic institutions and electoral politics (Omara, 2024; Khairullin, 2022b). Indonesia's post-Reformasi political environment, characterized by competitive elections, constitutional guarantees of political participation, and a relatively open public sphere, has therefore provided Islamist movements with opportunities to pursue their political objectives through institutional rather than revolutionary means.

The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) represents a particularly compelling case in the study of contemporary Islamism in Indonesia. As Greg Fealy notes in his introduction to Yon Machmudi's *Islamising Indonesia: The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)*, PKS possesses several distinctive characteristics that differentiate it from other Islamic political parties in Indonesia. First, unlike earlier Islamic parties such as Masyumi, PPP, PKB, or PBB, PKS draws much of its ideological and organizational inspiration from transnational Islamist movements, particularly Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwan al-Muslimin*). This influence is reflected in the extensive translation of Muslim Brotherhood literature, frequent references to Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb in party publications, and the symbolic adoption of Middle Eastern Islamist narratives and imagery.

Second, PKS remains one of the few genuinely cadre-based parties in contemporary Indonesian politics. The party maintains a highly structured system of recruitment, ideological training, and internal promotion, supported by regular grassroots meetings, religious study circles, and community activities. Compared with many Indonesian parties that rely heavily on patronage networks and transactional politics, PKS emphasizes organizational discipline, merit-based advancement, and internal democratic procedures.

Third, PKS has institutionalized community service as a central component of its political strategy. Through sustained social welfare programs—including disaster relief, free medical services, and community assistance—the party has cultivated a long-term public image as a caring and socially responsive political organization rather than relying solely on election-period campaigning.

Finally, PKS has consistently promoted public morality and anti-corruption as defining elements of its political identity. Although corruption has affected nearly all major political parties in post-Reformasi Indonesia, PKS has generally maintained stricter internal

disciplinary mechanisms, enforced anti-corruption regulations, and encouraged its legislators to expose abuses of power at both the national and local levels. These organizational characteristics have made PKS one of the most extensively studied Islamist parties in Southeast Asia ([Machmudi, 2008](#)).

The classification of PKS as either an Islamist or a post-Islamist party remains a subject of considerable scholarly debate. Several studies, including those by Argenti et al. ([2022](#)) argue that PKS has gradually evolved into a post-Islamist political party. Although the party explicitly declared itself an Islamic party upon its establishment ([Damanik, 2002](#)), its political platform has consistently emphasized pragmatic policy agendas rather than advocating the constitutional implementation of Islamic law. Instead, PKS has promoted slogans such as *clean, caring, and professional* while prioritizing issues commonly associated with democratic governance, including anti-corruption, good governance, and socio-economic justice ([Muhtadi, 2013](#)).

Beyond its electoral platform, PKS has also demonstrated a degree of ideological accommodation toward selected contemporary values that have traditionally been associated with liberal democratic discourse. For example, Rofhani and Fuad ([2021](#)) argue that PKS's female politicians have selectively adopted and adapted elements of feminist thought. While remaining firmly grounded in their own interpretations of Islamic teachings, they have sought to represent both male and female constituents by advocating improvements in women's social, cultural, and environmental rights. Such adaptations, however, remain carefully negotiated within the party's religious framework rather than representing an unconditional acceptance of liberal feminism ([Rofhani & Fuad, 2021](#)).

Similarly, despite the Muslim Brotherhood's traditional emphasis on the absolute sovereignty of God (*hakimiyyah*), PKS does not regard Islam and democracy as inherently incompatible. Instead, the party considers democracy to be a legitimate political mechanism through which Islamic values can be advanced within Indonesia's constitutional system. Drawing on the ideas of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, PKS argues that public participation in determining political institutions does not diminish God's ultimate sovereignty. This position reflects a more inclusive and pragmatic interpretation of political Islam, one that increasingly understands democracy as compatible with Islamic principles such as *shura* (consultation), *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* (enjoining good and forbidding evil), and the pursuit of justice ([Hasan, 2015](#)).

Nevertheless, substantial evidence continues to support the classification of PKS as an Islamist party. Although PKS has adopted a more gradual approach to the implementation of Sharia and no longer regards the Jakarta Charter as its primary political objective, it has never abandoned its commitment to Islamic law. Rather than advocating

a top-down constitutional imposition of Sharia, PKS promotes a bottom-up strategy that begins with the individual, extends to the family and society, and ultimately seeks to shape state institutions. According to Machmudi (2008), the party believes that once Islamic values become deeply embedded in society, the formal implementation of Sharia will emerge naturally rather than through coercive state intervention (Machmudi, 2008).

Historically, PKS's ideological roots also reinforce its Islamist identity. The party emerged from the *Jemaah Tarbiyah* movement, whose early activists were closely associated with organizations descending from the Masyumi tradition, including the *Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia* (DDII). Unlike Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, and several other Islamic organizations that eventually accepted Pancasila as the sole ideological foundation of the state, many Masyumi-derived groups remained committed to the formalization of Islamic law (Hidayat, 2020). Hasan (2015) further notes that the Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan*, PK), the predecessor of PKS, regarded the implementation of Sharia as the primary means of resisting Western political dominance and strengthening the Muslim community.

PKS's organizational identity further reflects its Islamist orientation. Beyond functioning as an electoral party, PKS defines itself as a *partai dakwah* (missionary party) committed to disseminating Islamic teachings and cultivating cadres as *anasir taghyir* (agents of social transformation), thereby positioning itself as both a political party and a religious social movement (Hidayat, 2020).

Similarly, Qodir (2013) argues that PKS should be understood primarily as a political party rather than a purely religious movement. Through comparative field research, he demonstrates that the party's political strategies consistently prioritize organizational and electoral interests, particularly in electoral contests involving its own cadres. For Qodir, such pragmatism does not diminish PKS's Islamist character; rather, it illustrates how Islamist objectives are increasingly pursued through strategic political competition within Indonesia's democratic system (Qodir, 2013).

The Analytical Limitations of Islamism and Post-Islamism in Explaining PKS

Although Islamism and post-Islamism have become the two dominant frameworks for explaining the evolution of Islamic political movements, neither adequately captures the ideological trajectory of the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). Existing scholarship generally positions PKS within one of these competing perspectives. Some scholars classify PKS as an Islamist party because of its roots in the *Jemaah Tarbiyah* movement, its intellectual affinity with the Muslim Brotherhood, and its enduring commitment to Islamic values. Others argue that PKS represents post-Islamism because of its participation in democratic politics, electoral pragmatism, and willingness to cooperate with secular

political actors. While both perspectives illuminate important aspects of PKS's development, they remain analytically incomplete because they assume that Islamism and post-Islamism constitute two mutually exclusive categories.

From the perspective of classical Islamism, PKS exhibits several characteristics that are difficult to reconcile with conventional Islamist theory. Classical Islamism generally emphasizes the formal implementation of Sharia, the establishment of an Islamic political order, and a relatively uncompromising approach toward democratic institutions. By contrast, PKS has consistently participated in democratic elections, accepted constitutional procedures, and formed governing coalitions with parties representing diverse ideological backgrounds. Rather than prioritizing the formal establishment of an Islamic state, the party has increasingly emphasized governance issues such as anti-corruption, social welfare, and public service while pursuing Islamic objectives through gradual institutional engagement. These developments indicate that PKS has adopted a pragmatic political strategy that extends beyond the explanatory capacity of conventional Islamism.

At the same time, interpreting PKS solely through the lens of post-Islamism is equally problematic. Although the party accepts democratic competition and political pluralism, it has not abandoned its Islamist identity. PKS continues to define itself as a *partai dakwah*, maintains a cadre system inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, and preserves Islamic values as the principal normative foundation of its political platform. Democracy is therefore understood not as a replacement for Islamism but as a legitimate political mechanism through which Islamic values can be advanced within Indonesia's constitutional framework. Consequently, PKS has adapted the methods of Islamist politics rather than fundamentally abandoning its ideological commitments, as post-Islamism would generally imply.

The limitations of both frameworks become evident when the defining characteristics of PKS are compared with the principal assumptions of Islamism and post-Islamism.

Table 2. Analytical Limitations of Islamism and Post-Islamism in Explaining PKS

No	Analytical Dimension	Islamism	Post-Islamism	PKS
1	Democracy	Viewed cautiously or rejected as a Western system	Accepted as an intrinsic political value	Accepted as a legitimate political mechanism compatible with Islamic principles

2	Islamic State	Explicit long-term political objective	De-emphasized or abandoned	No longer pursued formally, while Islamic values remain central
3	Sharia	Formal implementation through the state	Ethical and moral orientation	Gradual and normative implementation through democratic institutions
4	Political Identity	Explicitly Islamist	Religious identity becomes less central	Continues to identify itself as a <i>partai dakwah</i>
5	Political Strategy	Ideological rigidity	Democratic accommodation	Pragmatic adaptation without abandoning Islamist commitments

Source: Researcher's compilation from various sources, 2026

As shown in Table 2, PKS simultaneously exhibits characteristics associated with both Islamism and post-Islamism without fitting neatly into either framework. The party retains its ideological commitment to Islamic values while pragmatically adapting to democratic institutions, electoral competition, and coalition politics. This hybrid pattern suggests that the relationship between Islamism and post-Islamism should not be understood as a linear transition from one ideological stage to another. Rather, the Indonesian experience demonstrates that Islamist political actors may preserve their normative commitments while strategically adjusting their political behavior to democratic realities. Accordingly, this conceptual gap provides the basis for proposing Pragmatic Islamism as a conceptual refinement of existing debates on Islamism and post-Islamism. Rather than replacing these established frameworks, Pragmatic Islamism offers a more appropriate analytical lens for explaining political actors whose ideological orientation reflects both continuity and adaptation simultaneously.

Conclusion

This study concludes that PKS occupies an ambiguous ideological position that cannot be fully explained by either Islamism or post-Islamism. While the party maintains core Islamist aspirations, particularly regarding the gradual institutionalization of Islamic values, it simultaneously demonstrates pragmatic adaptation to Indonesia's democratic system through electoral participation, coalition-building, and selective engagement with contemporary political issues.

Based on these findings, this article proposes the concept of *Pragmatic Islamism* as a conceptual refinement of existing debates on Islamism and post-Islamism. Rather than representing a transition from one framework to another, *Pragmatic Islamism* describes an

ideological orientation characterized by (1) the continued commitment to Islamic values as the primary normative foundation of political action, (2) the acceptance of democratic institutions and electoral participation as legitimate political mechanisms, (3) pragmatic political accommodation through coalition-building and strategic electoral engagement, and (4) the gradual and non-confrontational pursuit of Islamic values within the existing constitutional framework. Through these defining characteristics, PKS demonstrates that Islamist political actors may preserve their long-term ideological commitments while strategically adapting to democratic governance without abandoning their Islamic identity.

Accordingly, this study argues that Islamism and post-Islamism should not be viewed as mutually exclusive categories, but as overlapping ideological tendencies capable of producing hybrid forms of Islamic politics. In this regard, *Pragmatic Islamism* is proposed not as a replacement for either framework, but as a conceptual refinement that provides a more comprehensive explanation of Islamist parties operating within contemporary democratic contexts.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank the Indonesian Education Scholarship (BPI), Center of Higher Education Funding and Assessment (PPAPT), and the Indonesia Endowment Fund for Education (LPDP) for funding this study through the Doctoral Scholarship Scheme.

References

- Adiwilaga, R. (2017a). Gerakan Islam Politik Dan Proyek Historis Penegakan Islamisme Di Indonesia Political Islam Movement and Historical Project of Islamism Enforcement in Indonesia. *Jurnal Wacana Politik*, 2(1), 1–9. <https://doi.org/10.24198/jwp.v2i1.11373>
- Adiwilaga, R. (2017b). Puritanisme Dan Fundamentalisme Dalam Islam Transnasional Serta Implikasinya Terhadap Pancasila Sebagai Ideologi Bangsa. *Journal of Governance*, 2(1). <https://doi.org/10.31506/jog.v2i1.2124>
- Adiwilaga, R. (2023). Hak Asasi Manusia dalam Perspektif Kelompok Islam Politik: Studi pada Perspektif Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Menyikapi Isu Hak Asasi Manusia. *Jurnal HAM Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia*, 16(2), 36–50. <https://doi.org/10.58823/jham.v16i2.171>
- Al Qurtuby, S. (2020). The Rise of Islamism and the Future of Indonesian Islam. *Journal of International Studies(Malaysia)*, 16, 105–128. <https://doi.org/10.32890/jis2020.16.7>
- A'La, A., Zamzami, M., Udin, N. H. W., & Aniq, A. F. (2018). Islamism in Madura from religious symbolism to authoritarianism. *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, 12(2), 159–194. <https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2018.12.2.159-194>

- Ali, A. (2000). Islamism: Emancipation, Protest and Identity. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 20, 11–28. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13602000050008870>
- Anawati, D. M., & Al-Hamdi, R. (2020). Soliditas Partai dan Stabilitas Perolehan Suara: Konsolidasi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera pada Pemilihan Umum Legislatif 2014. *JISPO Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik*, 10(1), 105–125. <https://doi.org/10.15575/jispo.v10i1.4636>
- Argenti, G., Paskarina, C., Darmayanti, N., & Deliarnoor, N. A. (2022). Post-Islamism in Indonesia: Analysis of Islamic Political Party Programs in the 2019 National Elections. *Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*, 11(1), 127–136. <https://doi.org/10.36941/ajis-2022-0011>
- Arif, M. Q. 'Ainul, & Wardhani, E. M. (2023). Indonesian Islamic Populism and Global Framing: A Content Analysis of the 212 Demonstration by the Greatpowers' News Agencies. *The Journal of Society and Media*, 6(2), 486–507. <https://doi.org/10.26740/jsm.v6n2.p486-507>
- Asisian, N. (2016). Shia Iran and Effects of Globalization on State and Religion: The Beginning of Post-Islamism Era. *Journal Article* May, (July). https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304976032_Shia_Iran_and_Effects_of_Globalization_on_State_and_Religion_The_Beginning_of_Post-Islamism_Era
- Aspinall, E., & Mietzner, M. (2014). Indonesian Politics in 2014: Democracy's Close Call. *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 50(3), 347–369. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2014.980375>
- Azizah, A. R. & M. 'arif J. (2012). Konflik Politik PKS dan Muhammadiyah. *Tajdida*, 10(2), 214–221. <http://publikasiilmiah.ums.ac.id/handle/11617/3294>
- Barton, G. (2006). Indonesia's Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam. *Conversations in Religion & Theology*, 4(1), 87–97. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1479-2214.2006.00084.x>
- Basyir, Ach. (2014). Ideologi Politik Dilematis Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) Antara Gerakan Tarbiyah dan Pragmatisme. *Jurnal Agama Dan Hak Azazi Manusia*, 3(2), 238. <https://doi.org/10.14421/inright.v3i2.1263>
- Bayat, A. (2005). Islamism and Social Movement Theory. *Third World Quarterly*, 26(6), 891–908. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590500089240>
- Bayat, A. (Ed.). (2013). *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199766062.001.0001>
- Ben Lazreg, H. (2021). Post-islamism in tunisia and egypt: Contradictory trajectories. *Religions*, 12(6). <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12060408>
- Berman, S. (2003). Islamism, Revolution, and Civil Society. *Perspectives on Politics*, 1, 257–272. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592703000197>
- Bubalo, A. (2005). *Joining the Caravan? Lowy Institute Paper 05*. <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/joining-caravan-middle-east-islamism-indonesia>.

- Cavatorta, F., & Merone, F. (2015). Post-Islamism, ideological evolution and 'la tunisianité' of the Tunisian Islamist party al-Nahda. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 20, 27–42. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2015.991508>
- Chalik, A. (2014). Fundamentalisme dan Masa Depan Ideologi Politik Islam. *Islamica: Jurnal Studi Keislaman*, 9(1), 54–80. <https://doi.org/10.15642/islamica.2014.9.1.54-80>
- Dokhanchi, M. (2020). Post-Islamism Redefined: Towards a politics of post-Islamism. *Journal of the Contemporary Study of Islam*, 1(1), 28–54. <https://doi.org/10.37264/jcsi.vii1.13>
- Damanik, A. S., & Keadilan, F. P. (2002). Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia. *Jakarta: Teraju*.
- Darajat, Z. (2017). Muhammadiyah dan NU: Penjaga Moderatisme Islam di Indonesia. *Hayula: Indonesian Journal of Multidisciplinary Islamic Studies*, 1(1), 79–94. <https://doi.org/10.21009/hayula.001.1.05>
- Hadiz, V. R. (2016). *Islamic Populism in Indonesia and the Middle East*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781316402382>
- Hakim, L. N. (2023). *Islamism in Indonesia: Setting the Stage BT - Islamism and the Quest for Hegemony in Indonesia* (L. N. Hakim, Ed.; pp. 1–28). Springer Nature Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9661-0_1
- Hannan, A. (2020). Islam moderat dan tradisi populer pesantren: Strategi penguatan Islam moderat di kalangan masyarakat Madura melalui nilai tradisi populer Islam berbasis pesantren. *Jurnal Sosiologi Dialektika*, 13(2), 152. <https://doi.org/10.20473/jsd.v13i2.2018.152-168>
- Hara, A. E., & Trihartono, A. (2019). The Failure of Islamic Populism: The Case of Indonesia's 2019 Election. 339(Aicosh), 259–263. <https://doi.org/10.2991/aicosh-19.2019.59>
- Haryanto, A., Maulida, S. I., & Darmawan, A. B. (2018). The Influence of AKP Party on Turkey 's State Identity during Erdogan Administration. *Global Strategis*, (2), 93–108. <https://doi.org/10.20473/jgs.13.2.2019.93-107>
- Hasan, N. (2011). Islam in Provincial Indonesia: Middle Class, Lifestyle, and Democracy. *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies*, 49(1), 119–157. <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2011.491.119-157>
- Hasan, N. (2015). New Horizon Of Reading Islam And Politics: Post-Islamism In Indonesia. *In Right: Jurnal Agama Dan Hak Azazi Manusia*, 4(2), 285–316. <https://doi.org/10.14421/inright.v4i2.1281>
- Hidayat, A. (2020). Strategi Pemenangan Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) Di Era Populisme Islam Dalam Pemilu Legislatif Tahun 2019. <https://etd.repository.ugm.ac.id/penelitian/detail/186980>
- Imad, A. G. (2019). Post-Islamism. *Contemporary Arab Affairs*. <https://doi.org/10.1525/CAA.2019.123001>

- Irwanti, N., & Pratama, M. I. bayu. (2022). The Impact of Kemal Atthaturk's Secularism on the Islamic World in the 19th Century. *El Tarikh : Journal of History, Culture and Islamic Civilization*, 3(1), 12–23. <https://doi.org/10.24042/jhcc.v3i1.7905>
- Ismail, S. M. (2004). Being Muslim: Islam, Islamism and Identity Politics. *Government and Opposition*, 39, 614–631. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00138.x>
- Karim, S. (2021). Post-Islamisme: Memahami Aksi Politik Islam Kontemporer. *Jurnal Politik Profetik*, 9(1), 119. <https://doi.org/10.24252/profetik.v9i1a7>
- Khairullin, T. R. (2022a). Trends in Political Islam: Transition towards Liberalization. *Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences*, 92(1), S100–S104. <https://doi.org/10.1134/S1019331622080056>
- Khairullin, T. R. (2022b). Trends in Political Islam: Transition towards Liberalization. *Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences*, 92(1), S100–S104. <https://doi.org/10.1134/S1019331622080056>
- Machmudi, Y. (2008). Islamising Indonesian: The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). In *Islamising Indonesian: The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)*. https://doi.org/10.26530/oopen_459299
- Mahdavi, M. (2019). Whither Post-Islamism: Revisiting the Discourse/Movement After the Arab Spring. *Arab Spring*. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24758-4_2
- Miichi, K. (2020). Post-Islamism Revisited: The Response of Indonesia's Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) to Gender-Related Issues. *Muslim World*, 110(4), 589–604. <https://doi.org/10.1111/muwo.12367>
- Mozaffari, M. (2007). What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept. *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 8(1), 17–33. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14690760601121622>
- Munabari, F., Larasati, N. U., Ihsan, R., & Nurhadiyanto, L. (2020). Islamic Revivalism in Indonesia: The Caliphate, Sharia, NKRI, Democracy, and the Nation-State. *Jurnal Politik*, 5(2), 281. <https://doi.org/10.7454/jp.v5i2.1016>
- Muhtadi, B. (2013). *Dilema PKS*. Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia.
- Omara, A. (2024). Why Not Indonesia an Islamic State? Constitutional Debate Concerning Religion-State Relation in A Muslim Majority Country. *Samarah: jurnal hukum keluarga dan hukum Islam*, 8(1), 421–444. <https://doi.org/10.22373/sjhg.v8i1.15889>
- Qodir, Z. (2023). *Post-Islamism and Legal Reform : The Challenges and Future of Political Islam in Indonesia*. 23(2), 281–306. <https://doi.org/10.15408/ajis.v23i2.31484>
- Qodir, Z. (2012). *Sosiologi Politik Islam: Kontestasi Islam Politik dan Demokrasi di Indonesia*. Pustaka Pelajar.
- Qodir, Z. (2013). *HTI dan PKS menuai kritik: perilaku gerakan Islam politik Indonesia*. JKSG.
- Qodir, Z. (2023). *Studi Politik Islam, Kekuasaan, dan Politik Indonesia*. UMY Press.

- Qodir, Z., & Misran. (2022). Prosperous Justice Party's (PKS) Political Philantropy During the Covid-19 Pandemic in Indonesia. *Journal of Positive School Psychology*, 6(6), 5583–5605. <https://journalppw.com/index.php/jpsp/article/view/8454>
- Rofhani, R., & Fuad, A. N. (2021). Moderating Anti-Feminism: Islamism and Women Candidates in the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 40(1), 156–173. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1868103421989076>
- Rokhmad, A. (2014). Dasar Negara Dan Taqiyyah Politik Pks. *Walisongo: Jurnal Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan*, 22(1), 1. <https://doi.org/10.21580/ws.2014.22.1.255>
- Rosdiawan, R. (2018). Memetakan Anatomi Diskursus Islamisme dan Terorisme Islam. *Islamica: Jurnal Studi Keislaman*, 13(1), 1–32. <https://doi.org/10.15642/islamica.2018.13.1.1-33>
- Sakai, M., & Fauzia, A. (2014). Islamic orientations in contemporary Indonesia: Islamism on the rise? *Asian Ethnicity*, 15, 41–61. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14631369.2013.784513>
- Smith-Hefner, N. J. (2016). Identity and Pleasure: The Politics of Indonesian Screen Culture. *Journal of Asian Studies*, 75(4), 1162–1164. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021911816001546>
- Sultan, L., Musyahid, A., & Asti, M. J. (2022). Islamic Law Legislation In An Effort To Reform Indonesia's National Law. *Al-Risalah Jurnal Ilmu Syariah Dan Hukum*, 93-104. <https://doi.org/10.24252/al-risalah.vi.28369>
- Tibi, B. (2012). *Islamism and Islam*. <https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300159981/islamism-and-islam/>
- Ungureanu, D. M. (2008). Between Islamism and Islam. *Cultura*, 5, 32–43. <https://doi.org/10.5840/cultura2008524>
- Wanandi, J. (2002). Islam in Indonesia: Its History, Development and Future Challenges. *Asia-Pacific Review*, 9, 104–112. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1343900022000036115>
- Yilmaz, I., Barton, G., & Barry, J. (2017). The decline and resurrection of Turkish Islamism: the story of Tayyip Erdogan's AKP. *Journal of Citizenship and Globalisation Studies*, 1(1), 48–62. <https://doi.org/10.21153/jcgs2017vol1no1art1061>
- Yusuf, M., Afrizal, A., & Alfiandi, B. (2022). Meta Analisis Studi Kelas Menengah Muslim di Indonesia. *Indonesian Journal of Religion and Society*, 4(1), 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.36256/ijrs.v4i1.238>
- Zahra, N., & Fatimah, F. (2023). Konsep PAN-islamisme menurut pemikiran Jamaluddin Al-Afghani dalam perkembangan partai politik di Indonesia. *Jurnal EDUCATIO: Jurnal Pendidikan Indonesia*, 9(1), 228. <https://doi.org/10.29210/1202322802>